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A prerequisite to being certified as a class under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is that there are “questions of law or fact common to
the class.” Although this “commonality” requirement had heretofore been
regarded as something that was easily satisfied, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes the Supreme Court gave the requirement new vitality by reading into it
an obligation to identify among the class a common injury and common
questions that are “central” to the dispute. Not only is such a reading of Rule
23’s commonality requirement unsupported by the text of the rule, but it also is
at odds with the historical understanding of commonality in both the class
action and joinder contexts. The Court’s articulation of a heightened
commonality standard can be explained by a combination of its negative view
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of the merits of the discrimination claims at issue in Dukes, the conflation of
the predominance requirement with commonality, and the Court’s apparent
penchant for favoring restrictive interpretations of procedural rules that
otherwise promote access. Although an unfortunate consequence of the Dukes
Court’s heightening of the commonality standard will be the enlivening of
challenges to class certifications that would otherwise never have been
imagined, this Article urges the Court to reject heightened commonality and
read Rule 23 in a manner that remains true to the language and history of the
common question requirement.
INTRODUCTION
“The text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed.”
-Justice Antonin Scalia1
The class certification decision is one of the most hard-fought battles in civil
litigation. Aggregating many claims in a single action can threaten defendants
with immense liability, a threat that can be reduced or avoided altogether when
prospective plaintiffs are denied the opportunity to pursue their claims
collectively. This battle has been waged primarily under Rule 23 over concerns
such as mootness,2 notice,3 predominance,4 and adequacy of representation.5
Whether monetary relief can be properly sought in the context of an injunctiverelief class certified under Rule 23(b)(2) has also been a point of contention.6
1 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 22 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
2 See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980) (holding that
appeal of denial of class certification is not mooted by tender of settlement offer and entry
of judgment, so long as time for appeal has not expired); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401
(1975) (holding that resolution of the controversy of the class representative after
commencement of the action does not moot the dispute with respect to the class).
3 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176, 178 (1974) (holding that
“individual notice to identifiable class members is not a discretionary consideration to be
waived in a particular case” and that “[t]he usual rule is that a plaintiff must initially bear
the cost of notice to the class”); see also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340,
356-59 (1978) (recognizing there may be circumstances where it is appropriate to shift to
the defendant the costs associated with providing notice to the class).
4 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622 (1997) (holding that
common questions did not predominate over individual ones in a proposed settlement class
involving plaintiffs exposed to asbestos products supplied by the defendant).
5 See, e.g., id. at 625-26 (holding, in attempted asbestos exposure litigation, that currently
injured plaintiffs cannot adequately represent exposure-only plaintiffs due to a conflict
among their respective compensation goals).
6 See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998)
(“[M]onetary relief predominates in (b)(2) class actions unless it is incidental to requested
injunctive or declaratory relief.”); Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 928-29
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What has heretofore not been the subject of the same degree of controversy,
however, is the issue of whether a proposed class had questions of law or fact
in common as required for class certification under Rule 23(a)(2).7 That
changed in 2011 when the Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes,8 in which it held that a putative employment-discrimination class did
not satisfy this “commonality” requirement.9
Commonality, which refers to the requirement that “there are questions of
law or fact common to the class,”10 is a prerequisite to class certification that,
prior to Dukes, had been seen as relatively easy to satisfy.11 It requires that
each member of the class assert claims that share legal or factual issues with
one another. For example, if there were a group of consumers, each of whom
had experienced the same product defect, a common factual question uniting
the class would be whether the product had an alleged defect;12 a common
legal question in this scenario might be whether the defendant owed and
breached a duty of care to the plaintiffs or negligently failed to warn them.13 In
short, identifying a factual determination to be made or a legal issue to be

(9th Cir. 1982) (“[T]his court has adopted the view that legal remedies which are incidental
to a request for injunctive relief may be included as a part of the (b)(2) claim.”).
7 Although the Supreme Court addressed the typicality and commonality requirements of
Rule 23(a) in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982),
which featured a commonality analysis that was clouded by its integration with the
typicality analysis, it was not until Dukes that the Court revisited commonality. Many cases
in the Rule 23(b)(3) damages class context dispense with an independent commonality
analysis and proceed directly to the issue of whether such common questions predominate
over individual ones, with the antecedent issue of commonality not being a real point of
contention. See, e.g., Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 146 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001).
The Supreme Court has endorsed this approach. See Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 609 (“Rule
23(a)(2)’s ‘commonality’ requirement is subsumed under, or superseded by, the more
stringent Rule 23(b)(3) requirement that questions common to the class ‘predominate over’
other questions. The court therefore trained its attention on the ‘predominance’ inquiry.”
(quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996))).
8 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
9 Id. at 2556-57.
10 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
11 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.23[2] (Mathew Bender
ed., 3d ed. 2011) (“Because commonality requires only one common question of law or fact,
some courts have written that the commonality requirement is easily satisfied.”).
12 Saltzman v. Pella Corp., 257 F.R.D. 471, 478 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (identifying as a
common factual question in the case “whether and when Pella ProLine Windows suffered
from an inherent wood ‘durability’ defect”).
13 Jones v. Allercare, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 290, 298-99 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (“The issues of
defendant’s defective formulation or design of the Powder and Spray and its failure to
provide reasonable warnings or instructions concerning the products are common to all
those allegedly injured by the Powder and/or Spray.”).
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resolved that was germane to the claims asserted by each class member had
been sufficient to meet the commonality standard of Rule 23(a)(2).14
The Dukes majority saw things differently. It was faced with “one of the
most expansive class actions ever,” consisting of roughly 1.5 million plaintiffs
who were current and former female employees of Wal-Mart.15 In a nutshell,
the plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart had policies that permitted local
supervisors to make pay and promotion decisions subjectively, which
“operated as a vehicle for perpetrating gender bias in its pay and promotion
decisions.”16 As a result, it was argued, female employees suffered from
discriminatory pay and promotion decisions, making Wal-Mart liable for
“engag[ing] in a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of Title VII’s
prohibition on disparate treatment.”17 The plaintiffs also challenged WalMart’s subjective practices “under the disparate impact theory of
discrimination.”18 Under these circumstances, the Dukes majority found the
requisite common questions completely lacking. It reached this result by
redefining commonality. The majority stated that merely raising a common
question “is not sufficient to obtain class certification.”19 Commonality
requires rather that the plaintiffs share the “same injury” raising “a common
contention,” the determination of which will resolve an issue that is “central”
to each of the claims.20 These attributes of commonality set forth by the
majority provide a basis to believe that all of the claims “can productively be
litigated at once.”21
Nothing in the language or history of Rule 23(a)(2) supports the Dukes
majority’s interpretation of it.22 Rule 23(a)’s commonality language says
14 Note that although the language of Rule 23(a)(2) requires “questions” of law or fact in
common, this plural use of the word has not been interpreted to require that there be
multiple common questions. See, e.g., 1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG
ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:20 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 5th ed. 2011) (“The commonality
test is more qualitative than quantitative, and thus, there need be only a single issue common
to all members of the class.”). The Dukes majority did not disturb this interpretation. See
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (“We quite agree that for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) even a single
common question will do.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
15 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
16 Brief for Respondents at 1-2, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277). The plaintiffs also
alleged unlawful retaliation under Title VII. Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint at 23,
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2252).
17 Brief for Respondents, supra note 16, at 9 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006); Int’l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336-38 (1977)).
18 Id. at 10 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 989-91 (1988)).
19
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
20
Id.
21 Id.
22 Dean Klonoff expresses the same view when he writes, “The majority decision in
Dukes cannot be squared with the text, structure, or history of Rule 23(a)(2). Nothing in the
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nothing of the nature or import of the legal or factual questions that class
members’ claims must share, nor does it mandate that class plaintiffs be bound
together by the “same injury.” The only requirement of commonality is that
common questions exist. How, then, did the Dukes majority derive its novel
formulation of “heightened commonality”?23 Claimant animus, combined with
hostility toward and a misunderstanding of claims of discrimination, incented
the majority to infuse the commonality requirement with a set of class
propriety concerns – unity of injury and the importance of the common
questions – it was not designed to police. The result is not an exercise in rule
interpretation, but rather yet another demonstration of the Court’s willingness
of late to place policy above principle in ways that restrict access to justice.24
This is a potentially alarming development, as jurists spar over the import
and application of Dukes to the commonality questions before them25 and with
some, though certainly not all,26 lower courts taking the heightened

text of Rule 23(a)(2), or in the Advisory Committee Notes thereto, requires that the common
question be central to the outcome.” Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming March 2013).
23 This Article uses this term to refer to the new commonality standard that requires class
members to have the same injury, that common questions be central to the litigation, and
that resolution of the common issues creates significant litigation efficiencies. This is
distinct from how some have referred to Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement as a
“heightened commonality” requirement. See Thomas v. Baca, 231 F.R.D. 397, 402 (C.D.
Cal. 2005) (“[T]his [predominance] requirement is essentially a heightened commonality
inquiry: do the common legal and factual questions appear more significant than the
individualized legal and factual questions?”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Payment of Expenses in
Securities Class Actions: Ethical Dilemmas, Class Counsel, and Congressional Intent, 22
REV. LITIG. 557, 583 (2003) (“The predominance requirement is in effect a heightened
commonality rule, demanding that questions of law or fact in some sense form the center of
gravity of the litigation, or that they will occupy the bulk of the court’s or the litigants’ time
and efforts.”).
24 For a discussion of this trend, see infra Part III.
25 Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 344 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., dissenting)
(“In stark contrast to the Majority’s practically limitless definition of commonality is the
measured definition provided by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.”); Gray v. Hearst Comm’ns, Inc., 444 F. App’x 698, 703-04 (4th Cir.
2011) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“With respect, the majority is mistaken in its attempt to
distinguish Wal-Mart on the basis of White Directory’s uniform distribution practice. . . .
Wal-Mart is squarely on point. . . . As in Wal-Mart, White Directory’s sales policy was one
of broad discretion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
26 Some courts have been more circumspect in their understanding of Dukes, limiting the
decision to its facts. See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
672 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Wal-Mart holds that if employment discrimination is
practiced by the employing company’s local managers, exercising discretion granted them
by top management . . . rather than implementing a uniform policy established by top
management to govern the local managers, a class action by more than a million current and
former employees is unmanageable; the incidents of discrimination complained of do not
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commonality approach to heart.27 For example, in M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v.
Perry,28 a suit seeking “to redress alleged class-wide injuries caused by
systemic deficiencies in Texas’s administration of [it’s foster care program],”29
the court announced that Dukes had fundamentally changed the standard for
commonality:

present a common issue that could be resolved efficiently in a single proceeding.”); Ross v.
RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 902-03 (7th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing Dukes based on
the presence of an alleged uniform policy of the defendant to deny overtime pay); Labriola
v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 12-79, 2012 WL 1657191, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2012)
(“While, in its motion, Defendant states that ‘no commonality exists as a matter of law,’
Defendant’s arguments actually relate to whether common questions predominate, not
whether any common questions exist at all. On the face of the [first amended complaint],
Plaintiff has identified at least one common question: whether Defendant had a policy and
practice of delaying payment of final wages. . . . This question can be resolved on a classwide basis, and the common answer is apt to drive resolution of the litigation.” (citation
omitted) (citing Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556)); Youngblood v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No.
09 Civ. 3176, 2011 WL 4597555, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011) (“Unlike the claims in WalMart[,] Plaintiffs’ [] claims do not require an examination of the subjective intent behind
millions of individual employment decisions; rather, the crux of this case is whether the
company-wide policies, as implemented, violated Plaintiffs’ statutory rights.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
27 See, e.g., Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 493, 497-98 (7th Cir. 2012)
(finding that class plaintiffs failed to establish commonality under the Dukes standard in an
action alleging the failure to ensure children’s rights under the Individuals with Disabilities
in Education Act); Haggart v. Endogastric Solutions, Inc., No. 10-346, 2012 WL 2513494,
at *4 n.5 (W.D. Pa. June 28, 2012) (“While it appears that there could certainly be common
issues resolvable in a way that would move the litigation forward . . . and/or common
questions of law, it also appears that class members have not suffered the same class of
injury and that commonality would therefore not be met under Dukes.” (emphasis omitted)
(citation omitted)); Rowe v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., No. 09-cv-491, 2012 WL 1068754, at
*5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes has made the question of whether the nationwide class satisfies the commonality
requirement in Rule 23(a) a more challenging one . . . .”); In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc.
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1052 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“Under
previous Fifth Circuit precedent, commonality required ‘one common question of law or
fact’ to the class. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court held that the mere
‘raising of common “questions” of law or fact’ is no longer sufficient.” (citations omitted)
(quoting James v. City of Dallas, 254 F.3d 551, 570 (5th Cir. 2001); Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at
2551)); In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 279 F.R.D. 598, 607 (D. Kan.
2012) (“Dukes is relevant because it arguably heightened the commonality requirement
under Rule 23(a) and narrowed the permissible scope of a Rule 23(b)(2) class.”); see also,
e.g., Munoz v. Giumarra Vineyards Corp., No. 1:09-cv-00703, 2012 WL 2617553, at *19
(E.D. Cal. July 5, 2012) (applying Dukes’s “same injury” requirement to find the requisite
commonality under Rule 23(a)(2)).
28 675 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2012).
29
Id. at 835.
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[T]he commonality test is no longer met when the proposed class merely
establishes that “there is ‘at least one issue whose resolution will affect all
or a significant number of the putative class members.’” Rather, Rule
23(a)(2) requires that all of the class member’s claims depend on a
common issue of law or fact whose resolution “will resolve an issue that
is central to the validity of each one of the [class member’s] claims in one
stroke.”30
As a result, even though the district court found a common question of fact to
be “whether Defendants failed to maintain a caseworker staff of sufficient size
and capacity to perform properly,” the circuit panel found this insufficient to
satisfy the commonality requirement.31 The stated reason was that the “district
court failed to describe how a finding that Texas fails to maintain a caseworker
staff that performs ‘properly’ will resolve an issue that is ‘central to the
validity of each one of the [class member’s] claims in one stroke.’”32 If an
increasing number of courts embrace the heightened commonality standard of
Dukes, class certification will become more difficult, something that will
reduce the deterrent effect of the class action device.33 Further, because the
common question requirement appears in other rules pertaining to joinder34
and consolidation of actions,35 heightening commonality under Rule 23
promises to bleed into these other areas, making aggregating litigation more
difficult beyond the class action context. Indeed, litigants have begun arguing
that Dukes’s heightened commonality standard should be applied beyond class
actions to the “similarly situated” requirement for collective actions brought
30

Id. at 840 (alteration in original) (quoting Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101,
1106 (5th Cir. 1993); Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551).
31 Id. at 841.
32 Id. (quoting Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551).
33 Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. WalMart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 44-45 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/la
wreview/colloquy/2011/18/LRColl2011n18Malveaux.pdf (“[T]o satisfy commonality
generally, judges may now require a stronger causal connection between an employer’s
discretionary decisionmaking policy and a disparity or adverse employment action. This
shift will make it harder for employees relying on this theory to act collectively.” (footnote
omitted)); George Rutherglen, Wal-Mart, AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of the Deterrent
Class Action, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 24, 29 (2012), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbr
ief.php?s=inbrief&p=2012/04/14/post (“In sum, the holding on commonality in Wal-Mart
diminishes the prospect of certification and in doing so, diminishes the likelihood that a
class action will be brought. The net effect is to reduce the defendant’s exposure to classwide liability and the deterrent effect of class actions generally.”).
34 See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (requiring that there be a common question of law or fact for
party joinder); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (requiring the same for permissive intervention).
35 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006) (requiring that there be a common question of law or
fact for handling separate actions jointly during the pretrial phase under the multidistrict
litigation statute); FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (requiring the same for consolidation of actions for
trial).

448

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:441

under the Fair Labor Standards Act.36 Some courts,37 but not all,38 have
embraced these arguments.
Dukes’s heightened commonality standard is also disquieting in light of the
Court’s other recent decisions trending in the direction of restricting access to
justice by making it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring claims and have them
heard. From the loosening of summary judgment standards39 to the heightening
of pleading obligations,40 getting in the courthouse door and to a consideration
of the merits of one’s claim has become increasingly difficult. Although class
actions had certainly not been an area in which the road to the courthouse was
free and clear,41 expanding the battlefield beyond the areas of traditional
concern into the commonality inquiry is a bridge too far. Some members of
Congress have already recognized this and introduced legislation designed to
overcome the Court’s limiting interpretation of commonality by creating a new

36

29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (“An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of
the preceding sentences may be maintained against any employer (including a public
agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly
situated.”); see also, e.g., Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, No. 11 Civ. 1279, 2012 WL
2574742, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012) (“Defendants also argue that though Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23 is not applicable to collective actions, the ‘commonality’ standard set forth in Rule
23(a) is analogous to the ‘similarly situated’ requirement in section 216(b). . . . Defendants
argue that the [Dukes] standard should be applied here . . . .”).
37 See, e.g., Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 3:08CV540, 2012 WL 113657, at *4
(W.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 2012) (holding that the “similarly situated” standard under § 216(b) and
the commonality standard under Rule 23(a)(2) are “nearly identical” and thus the Dukes
interpretation of commonality is relevant in the FLSA context); Ruiz v. Serco, Inc., No. 10cv-394, 2011 WL 7138732, at *6-7 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 5, 2011) (indicating that Dukes is
instructive in FLSA cases); MacGregor v. Farmers Ins. Exch., No. 2:10-CV-03088, 2011
WL 2981466, at *4 (D.S.C. Jul. 22, 2011) (taking guidance from Dukes when deciding a
collective action motion).
38 See, e.g., Winfield v. Citibank, N.A., 843 F. Supp. 2d 397, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(holding that, notwithstanding Dukes, “the stringent requirements for class certification
under Rule 23 are not identical to the minimal burden that plaintiffs carry on a motion for
conditional certification under § 216(b)”); Pippins v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 0377, 2012
WL 19379, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2012).
39
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
583 (1986).
40 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007).
41 Significant certification hurdles characterize the landscape here. Amchem and Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), are noted for having increased the difficulties
associated with certifying nationwide personal injury classes. See Samuel Issacharoff,
Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 208 (“As a result [of Amchem
and Ortiz], class actions seemed to drop out of the available set of tools for attempting to
settle most mass torts . . . .”).
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“group action” device for those challenging discrimination in employment.
The device would permit circumvention of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Rule
23 and would dispense with any commonality requirement.42
The aim of this Article is to challenge the Supreme Court’s misreading of
the commonality requirement before it takes root by illustrating its impropriety
and potentially pernicious effects. To fully understand the error of the Dukes
majority’s interpretation of commonality, it is useful to begin by exploring the
origins of Rule 23’s common question requirement and how that language has
been traditionally understood and applied. Part I undertakes this task. It reveals
that the Dukes interpretation improperly unites and confuses repudiated and
historically distinct concepts – the notion of common rights or injuries versus
common questions of law or fact – not intended to be part of today’s common
question requirement. Armed with this knowledge, Part II turns to a direct
consideration of the interpretive errors reflected in the Dukes commonality
holding. Beyond being at odds with the historical development of the text, the
interpretation is deficient for its very departure from the text of Rule 23, as
well as for its reliance on twisted understandings of precedent and its
conflation of Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement with Rule 23(a)(2)’s
commonality provision. Having laid bare the defects of the Dukes
interpretation of commonality, Part III theorizes why the Dukes majority took
the position that it did. It argues that the creation of heightened commonality is
a definitive example of a larger trend of declining access to civil justice. This
trend reflects what I have previously described as a restrictive ethos in civil
procedure.43 The restrictive ethos thesis is that the Court uses access-restricting
interpretations of procedural rules to thwart disfavored claims asserted by
members of disempowered groups against members of the dominant class,
such as major corporations.
I.

THE ROOTS OF COMMONALITY

In Dukes, Justice Scalia offers a new vision of the commonality requirement
of Rule 23(a)(2): class plaintiffs must be united by the same injury, pursuing
claims with common questions that are central to the resolution of the dispute.
If one tracks the development of Rule 23 and focuses on the origins and

42 Equal Employment Opportunity Restoration Act of 2012, S. 3317, 112th Cong. § 2 (as
introduced by Sen. Franken, June 20, 2012) (“The purpose of this Act is to restore
employees’ ability to challenge, as a group, discriminatory employment practices, including
subjective employment practices.”). Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to
comment on the merits of this legislative proposal, suffice it to say that to the extent the
Court constricts access to courts through its interpretation of procedural doctrine, it is no
surprise that members of Congress who would prefer to see greater access to courts would
attempt to create avenues that facilitate such access, particularly if they view such access as
instrumental in promoting policy ends they value, such as antidiscrimination.
43 A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 353, 353-54 (2010).
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original understanding of the commonality provision,44 however, it is clear that
the interpretation of commonality offered by the Dukes majority attempts to
resurrect concepts that are distinct and have been long abandoned.
Although Rule 23 is derived largely from the representative action provision
in the Federal Equity Rules of 1912, the “common question of law or fact”
language derives most directly from the English joinder rule, which was
promulgated in the late nineteenth century. Exploring English practice under
this rule can thus enlighten one’s view of commonality. To see this connection,
it is best to work backward. Section A examines the 1938 version of Rule 23
and its American and English antecedents. Section B then turns to the modern
version of Rule 23 promulgated in 1966 in light of this history.
A.

The Antecedents of Rule 23

Rule 23 restated and replaced Rule 38 of the Federal Equity Rules of 1912.45
Equity Rule 38, which dealt with “representatives of a class,” read as follows:
“When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons
constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all
before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.”46 Although the
1912 Equity Rule 38 replaced former Equity Rule 48 – which allowed courts to
dispense with joining all parties in a suit when they were too numerous to be
joined without causing delay and inconvenience – Rule 48 lacked any
reference to a question of common interest.47 That language appears to have

44

This type of historically focused analysis is typically endorsed by Justice Scalia, at
least in the constitutional interpretation context. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130
S. Ct. 3020, 3057-58 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he question to be decided is not
whether the historically focused method is a perfect means of restraining aristocratic judicial
Constitution-writing; but whether it is the best means available in an imperfect world. . . . I
think it beyond all serious dispute that it is much less subjective, and intrudes much less
upon the democratic process.”); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008) (using
historical analysis to determine whether a forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the
confrontation right existed during the founding era). Historical analysis is appropriate here
not to understand the intention behind an ambiguous text, as the text of Rule 23(a)(2) is far
from ambiguous, but rather to reveal that the Dukes interpretation is connected to concepts
that were contained in separate provisions of predecessors to Rule 23 that were expressly
discarded when the Rule was amended in 1966.
45 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (1938) advisory committee’s note (“This is a substantial
restatement of Equity Rule 38 (Representatives of Class) as that rule has been construed.”).
46 FED. R. EQ. 38 (1912) (repealed 1938), reprinted in HOPKINS’ NEW FEDERAL EQUITY
RULES 214 (James Love Hopkins ed., 4th ed. 1924).
47 See FED. R. EQ. 48 (1842) (repealed 1912), reprinted in HOPKINS’ NEW FEDERAL
EQUITY RULES, supra note 46, at 104-05 (“Where the parties on either side are very
numerous, and cannot, without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be
all brought before it, the Court in its discretion may dispense with making all of them
parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all the
adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly before it.”).
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been borrowed from an 1849 amendment to the Field Code by the New York
legislature, which added a provision that is nearly identical to what was found
in Equity Rule 38.48 In turn, it has been suggested that the Code provision was
inspired by Justice Story’s discussion of when representative actions would be
appropriate, which he indicated would be “[w]here the parties are very
numerous . . . or where the question is of a general interest, and a few may sue
for the benefit of the whole.”49
These numerosity and question of common interest themes of the equity and
code rules were carried forward when the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were promulgated and Rule 23 was created to address class actions.
The original version of Rule 2350 made several innovations, however. First, in
subparagraph (a)(1), the 1938 rule spoke of the enforcement of a “right” that
was “joint, or common” as being sufficient for the first of three different kinds

48 The text of the amended Field Code provision read: “[W]hen the question is one of a
common or general interest of many persons, or when the parties are very numerous and it
may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for
the benefit of the whole.” 1849 N.Y. Laws ch. 438 § 119. Charles Clark, reporter for the
original Federal Rules Advisory Committee, lamented the disjunctive use of “or” here,
permitting class treatment when there was numerosity or commonality. See RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INSTITUTE OF FEDERAL RULES 264 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938) [hereinafter CLEVELAND
INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS].
49 West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718, 722 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 17,424) (emphasis
added); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS 97 (Boston, Charles
C. Little & James Brown 1838) (commenting that one of the most common type of cases
illustrating an exception to the requirement of actual joinder is “where the question is one of
a common or general interest, and one or more sue, or defend for the benefit of the whole”);
William Wirt Blume, The “Common Questions” Principle in the Code Provision for
Representative Suits, 30 MICH. L. REV. 878, 878-79 (1932) (suggesting the Justice Story
connection). Professor Yeazell derides Justice Story’s discussion of representative actions in
West when he writes that in West, Justice Story “trotted out a parade of incompletely
digested and almost completely irrelevant learning about group litigation.” STEPHEN C.
YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 217 (1987).
50 The original Rule 23 read, in pertinent part:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will
fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued,
when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right
refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to
enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or
may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several
rights and common relief is sought.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (1938).
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of class actions,51 a category subsequently referred to as a “true” class action.52
Second, subsection (a)(2) of the 1938 rule permitted class actions when the
right to be enforced was not joint or common but was “several,” provided the
action concerned specific property53 – the “hybrid” class action.54 Third, under
subsection (a)(3) of the 1938 rule, classes of claimants whose interests were
several could also be permitted if there was “a common question of law or fact
affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought,”55 a so-called
“spurious” class action.56 Observe that the 1938 version of Rule 23 moved
from one type of commonality found in the equity rule to three, using the term
“common” – meaning shared57 – on three occasions. The term was first used to
refer to a “common” right to be enforced by the class; second, to refer to
“common questions of law or fact affecting the several rights” of the class; and
third, to refer to “common relief” that is sought by the class.58 These references
within a single rule are the result of a blending of influences from the
representative action and joinder rules of early American codes and English
procedure. Each of these influences is disaggregated and reviewed below.
1.

The Precursors of the Common Right Requirement

Although not the focus of this Article, taking a brief look at the forerunners
of the common right requirement advances the goal of understanding the
common question test by way of contradistinction. That is, as one comes to
understand the distinctive nature and meaning of this trait vis-à-vis the
common question standard, any confusion between the two can be thwarted.
The 1938 version of Rule 23(a)(1) permitted class treatment when “the right
sought to be enforced for or against the class is [] joint, or common.”59 This
type of class was the “true” class and reflected party joinder rules under the
codes. The Field Code made joinder compulsory for parties who were “united
in interest” and permissive for parties who had an interest in the “subject of the
action” or “controversy.”60 The subject of an action was what was at issue in

51

Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1966) advisory committee’s note on 1966 amendment to rules
(“[T]he so-called ‘true’ category was defined as involving ‘joint, common, or secondary
rights . . . .’”).
53 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (1938).
54 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1966) advisory committee’s note on 1966 amendment to rules
(referring to “the ‘hybrid’ category[] as involving ‘several’ rights related to ‘specific
property’”).
55 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (1938) (emphasis added).
56 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1966) advisory committee’s note on 1966 amendment to rules.
57 1 THE NEW CENTURY DICTIONARY 291 (1927) (defining “common” as “[b]elonging
equally to or shared alike by two or more or all in question”).
58
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1938).
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (1938).
60 FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING § 99 (1848)
52
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the case, such as the premises to be partitioned,61 the damages sustained by an
injunction,62 or the harm caused by a defendant’s act.63 When each plaintiff
was concerned with a particular subject, the requisite connection among them
to permit joinder could be found. No such common interest in the subject of an
action would be found, however, when the plaintiffs separately suffered harm
from the similar conduct of a common defendant on different occasions.64
Interestingly, although a common interest in the subject matter of the suit was
required for simple party joinder, the standard for permitting a representative
action under the codes seemed broader, requiring only a common interest in a
question before the court.65 As shown below, this broader approach found a

[hereinafter FIELD CODE]; id. §§ 97-98.
61 Ripple v. Gilborn, 8 How. Pr. 456, 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853) (“The Code directs that
all persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief
demanded may (should) be joined as plaintiffs. The subject of this action is the premises
sought to be partitioned, and no one pretends to deny but that the plaintiff’s wife possesses
an inchoate right of dower in said premises.” (citation omitted)).
62 Loomis v. Brown, 16 Barb. 325, 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853) (“[W]here an action is
brought upon an injunction bond, the subject of the action being the damage sustained by
the plaintiffs in consequence of the injunction . . . all the obligees may join as plaintiffs . . .
.” (emphasis omitted)).
63 Simar v. Canaday, 53 Sickels 298, 306, 1873 WL 5719, at *5 (N.Y. 1873) (“Here both
plaintiffs have an interest in the subject of the action; be that subject the property conveyed,
or the acts of the defendant and the consequent damage, and both have an interest in
obtaining the relief demanded.”).
64 This point is illustrated in Gray v. Rothschild, 1 N.Y.S. 299 (Sup. Ct. 1888), a case
involving seven different businesses that sold goods at different times to the defendants as a
result of false representations:
The subject of the action is the recovery of the damages sustained by each one of the
firms in the sale of their own goods. Each sale was distinct from all the others, and
made upon fraudulent representations inducing such sale. There was no concurrent or
joint action by the several firms whose members have been joined as plaintiffs in the
sales of their respective goods, but each firm proceeded and transacted the business for
itself; and for the value or price of its goods, if the facts are truthfully alleged in the
complaint, each firm is entitled to a separate and distinct recovery. And no facts are
alleged in the case, in any form, which would secure to the plaintiffs joint relief by way
of a joint judgment.
Id. at 300.
65 1849 N.Y. Laws ch. 438 § 119 (“When the question is one of a common or general
interest of many persons, or when the parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable
to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the
whole.”). Professor Blume noted the difference between the two standards found in the
joinder and representative action rules under the codes:
[I]t seems clear that these two provisions of the code furnish different tests for
determining when persons may join as plaintiffs in an action. The requirement that they
have an interest in “the subject” of the action suggests that there must be some one title
or thing which is the subject of the action and in which all the plaintiffs must have an
interest, while the requirement that they have a common or general interest in “the
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home in the spurious class action of 1938’s Rule 23(a)(3), while the tighter
commonality of interest in the subject of the suit bears closer resemblance to
the original “joint, or common” right provision of the true class action of Rule
23(a)(1).66
In nineteenth-century England, both the representative action rule and the
basic joinder rule initially required the same unity of interest in the subject
matter of the suit that was reflected in similar provisions in the American codes
previously discussed. The English representative action rule, Rule 9 of Order
XVI of the English Rules of the Supreme Court, read as follows:
Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one cause
or matter, one or more such persons may sue or be sued, or may be
authorized by the Court or a Judge to defend in such cause or matter, on
behalf or for the benefit of all persons so interested.67
This “same interest” requirement typically was interpreted strictly to preclude
claims that were based on rights lacking a “common origin”68 or claims that
sought damages as relief.69 Thus, even if there was a common source of the
plight of multiple plaintiffs, that was not a sufficient connection to permit a
representative action.70

question” before the court suggests that joinder is allowed where, if separate suits were
brought, the same question of law or fact would be involved.
Blume, supra note 49, at 880.
66 Note that these subsection references are to the 1938 rule and its numbering, which
differs from that of the current version of Rule 23.
67 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (English), 1883, Order XVI, r. 9 (emphasis added).
Decades before the promulgation of the English rule, Frederic Calvert had used similar
language to theorize on the topic of representative litigation, concluding that “when a large
number of persons have a common interest in the entire object of a suit in its nature
beneficial to all, one or more of them may sue on behalf of all.” FREDERIC CALVERT, A
TREATISE UPON THE LAW RESPECTING PARTIES TO SUITS IN EQUITY *41 (1837). Credit for
this reference goes to Professor Yeazell, who expounds on the insight and contribution of
Calvert in his important book on the history of class actions. See YEAZELL, supra note 49, at
207-10.
68 Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co., [1910] 2 K.B. 1021 (C.A.) 1029 (Vaughan
Williams L.J.) (“[I]n the present case there is no common origin of the claims of those who
shipped goods on board the Knight Commander – the contracts were constituted by the bills
of lading, which manifestly might differ much in their form, and as to the exceptions, and
probably would vary somewhat according to the nature of the goods shipped.”).
69 Id. at 1040-41 (Fletcher Moulton L.J.) (“To my mind no representative action can lie
where the sole relief sought is damages, because they have to be proved separately in the
case of each plaintiff, and therefore the possibility of representation ceases.”).
70 Lord Justice Vaughan Williams, writing in Markt, illustrated this understanding of the
“same interest” requirement in rejecting a representative action attempted by multiple
shippers whose respective cargoes were lost when a steamship was sunk by a Russian
cruiser:
These shippers no doubt have a common wrong in that their goods were lost by the
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The Origin of the “Common Question” Requirement

This common interest approach of the code joinder practice and English
representative action jurisprudence characterized ordinary party joinder
practice in England as well, but only up to 1896. Before that point, courts
regularly interpreted the English joinder rule, Rule 1 of Order XVI of the
English Rules of the Supreme Court,71 as requiring parties to be united in their
interest in the same cause of action.72 For example, in Carter v. Rigby, the
plaintiffs, survivors of fifty miners who were drowned in the flooding of a
mine, sought to join in a single action against the defendants, the mine
owners.73 The court, bound by prior precedent interpreting the joinder rule,
held that the rule “does not authorize the joinder of the plaintiffs in this action,
although the matter which is alleged against the defendants, and which gave
rise to all the actions, was the same in each case.”74
In response to this line of cases, however, the Rules of the Supreme Court
were amended to reform joinder practice in a manner that created the very
common question requirement now found in Rule 23. In 1896, Rule 1 of Order
XVI of the English Rules of the Supreme Court was amended to read as
follows:
All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs, in whom any right
to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or series of
transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, where if such persons brought separate actions any common
question of law or fact would arise; provided that, if upon the application
of any defendant it shall appear that such joinder may embarrass or delay
the trial of the action, the court or a judge may order separate trials . . . .75
The original version of Rule 1, promulgated in 1883, lacked the “transaction”
and “common question” language76 added by the 1896 amendment.77

sinking of the Knight Commander by the Russian warship; but I see no common right,
or common purpose, in the case of these shippers . . . . All sorts of facts and all sorts of
exceptions may defeat the right of individual shippers. The case of each shipper must
to my mind depend upon its own merits.
Id. at 1029-30 (Vaughan Williams L.J.).
71 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (English), 1883, Order XVI, r. 1 (“All persons may be
joined as plaintiffs in whom the right to any relief claimed is alleged to exist, whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative.”).
72 See Carter v. Rigby & Co., [1896] 2 Q.B. 113 at 114; Peninsular & Oriental Steam
Navigation Co. v. Tsune Kijima, [1895] A.C. 661 (H.L.) 664 (appeal taken from China and
Japan); Smurthwaite v. Hannay, [1894] A.C. 494 (H.L.) 496 (appeal taken from Eng.).
73 Carter, 2 Q.B. at 113.
74 Id. at 119 (Lord Esher M.R.) (citing Smurthwaite, A.C. at 496).
75 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (English), 1896, Order XVI, r. 1 (emphasis added); see
also Benning v. Ilford Gas Co., [1907] 2 K.B. 290 at 290 n.1.
76 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (English), 1883, Order XVI, r. 1.
77 See JOHN INDERMAUR, A MANUAL OF THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
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According to judges of the English Court of Appeal at the time, the
amendment was in response to cases in which joinder was denied,
notwithstanding the presence of common questions.78 This alteration created a
distinction between the common rights connection needed for representative
actions and the more relaxed common question standard for simple joinder.
Not too long after this amendment, the court in Markt & Co. v. Knight
Steamship Co.79 highlighted this distinction when it faced a circumstance – the
loss of respective cargo by independent shippers due to the same sinking of a
ship – that failed to satisfy the “same interest” requirement for a representative
action but satisfied the common question requirement for simple joinder.80
Lord Justice Williams emphasized the difference thusly:
I do not think that the Judicature Act Orders and Rules intended that r. 9
of Order XVI. [(the representative action rule)] should be available
whenever those on whose behalf the plaintiff affected to sue could shew
that the right to relief arose in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions alleged to exist, whether jointly,
severally, or in the alternative where, if such persons brought separate
actions, any common question of law or fact would arise, such as to allow
a joinder of plaintiffs under Order XVI., r. 1 [(the basic joinder rule)].81
Therefore, even though the plaintiffs in Markt suffered from a “common
wrong,”82 the common interest needed to permit a representative action was
not present, meaning the representative action failed. This made clear the
distinction between the same-interest and common question standards, with the
former being more stringent than the latter.
The case of Universities of Oxford and Cambridge v. George Gill & Sons83
provides one of the earliest discussions of the new common question concept.
At issue in that case was Gill & Sons’ unauthorized publication of texts
bearing the Oxford and Cambridge names and arms, confusing consumers and
harming the respective plaintiffs.84 The question before the court was whether
the two plaintiffs could join their separate claims. After finding the transaction
test satisfied, the court looked for common questions.85 The court explained
JUDICATURE IN THE KING’S BENCH AND CHANCERY DIVISIONS 34 (London, Stevens and
Haynes, 8th ed. 1901).
78 Stroud v. Lawson, [1898] 2 Q.B. 44 (C.A.) 49-51 (A.L. Smith L.J.) (“That rule
[amending Rule 1, Order XVI] was brought into operation after the decision in Carter v.
Rigby & Co. The first of the cases which led to an alteration of the rules on this subject was
Smurthwaite v. Hannay.”).
79 [1910] 2 K.B. 1021 (C.A.) 1029.
80 Id. at 1027.
81 Id. at 1030.
82 Id. at 1029-30.
83 [1899] 1 Ch. 55 (Eng.).
84 Id. at 55-59.
85 Id. at 60-61.

2013]

HEIGHTENED COMMONALITY

457

that under the joinder rule, the analysis entailed no more than identifying a
factual question the court would need to decide to resolve the claims of both
plaintiffs, “‘where if such persons brought separate actions any common
question of law or fact would arise.’”86 In other words, if each plaintiff
proceeded individually, what legal or factual questions, if any, would arise in
both cases? Applying that test, the court found at least two common questions:
first, the publication of the books, and second, the effect on consumers of
titling the offending books as “The Oxford and Cambridge Edition.”87 The
court found that joinder was therefore appropriate.88
Understanding this change in English law and the distinct meaning of the
common right versus the common question standards is important for our
purposes because it is from this 1896 version of the English joinder rule that
the common question concept within Rule 23 derives. Recall that Equity Rule
38 used the phrase “question . . . of common or general interest.”89 The 1938
version of Rule 23(a)(3) adopted the phrase “common question of law or
fact.”90 Indeed, similar common question language appeared in other new
Federal Rules as well: Rule 20, the permissive joinder rule;91 Rule 24, the rule
permitting intervention of parties;92 and Rule 42, the rule permitting the
consolidation of actions for trial.93 This was not by coincidence. Charles Clark,
the Reporter for the committee that drafted the 1938 Rules, described the
86

Id. at 61 (quoting RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (English), 1896, Order XVI, r. 1).
Id. at 61.
88 Id. at 61-62. It is worth noting that under the English joinder rule, courts retained
discretion to order separate trials even if common questions of law or fact were present. This
discretion was exercised in a manner evocative of the predominance inquiry under Rule
23(b)(3) today:
It is impossible to lay down any rule as to how the discretion of the Court ought to be
exercised. Broadly speaking, where claims by or against different parties involve or
may involve a common question of law or fact bearing sufficient importance in
proportion to the rest of the action to render it desirable that the whole of the matters
should be disposed of at the same time the Court will allow the joinder of plaintiffs or
defendants . . . .
Payne v. British Time Recorder Co., [1921] 2 K.B. 1 (C.A.) 16 (Scrutton L.J.). As explored
below, the Dukes majority’s approach to commonality integrates this discretionary concern
over the weight of the common question into the meaning of the common question
requirement itself rather than leaving it within the realm of the predominance inquiry of
today’s Rule 23(b)(3).
89 FED. R. EQ. 38 (1912) (replaced in 1938 by FED. R. CIV. P. 23).
90 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (1938).
91 FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (1938).
92 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (1938).
93 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (1938). The common question language also appears in the
Multidistrict Litigation statute, although it is confined to common questions of fact: “When
civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different
districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006).
87
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“spurious class suit” of Rule 23(a)(3) as “really only a kind of joinder”94 and
indicated that it was “merely a short cut to cases where joinder is
permissive.”95 Looking then to the basic joinder rule, Rule 20, one finds the
source of the common question language of Rule 23(a)(3). As the Advisory
Committee note expressly states, Rule 20, in turn, borrowed the “common
question” language from the English joinder rule.96 In discussions surrounding
the new joinder rules, Clark indicated that the “common question of law or fact
test” – the exact language that appears in Rule 23(a)(3) – came directly from
the English rule and he endorsed its breadth.97
3.

The Contradistinction Between Common Questions and Common
Rights

As has been shown, the common right and common question concepts have
distinct meanings and origins. Knowing this clarifies why the two concepts are
distinguished from one another in the 1938 version of Rule 23. Indeed, the
three separate uses of the term “common” in the 1938 rule, in light of this
history, reflect three different types of commonality, each distinct from the
others. That is, a common question is not the same thing as, or subsumed
within, a common right. And a common question is not identical to common
relief, as both were requirements of being certified as a class under former
Rule 23(a)(3).
The decision in Skinner v. Mitchell98 – cited by the original Advisory
Committee as illustrative of the circumstances under which the common
question requirement of Rule 23 would be satisfied – quoted Pomeroy’s Equity
Jurisprudence to illuminate the distinction between common rights and
common questions in the class action context as follows:
“[N]otwithstanding the positive denials by some American courts, the
weight of authority is simply overwhelming that the jurisdiction may and

94

CLEVELAND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 48, at 264.
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT
WASHINGTON, D.C. AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY 67 (Edward H. Hammond
ed., 1939).
96 FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (1938) advisory committee’s note (“The first sentence is derived
from English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 16, r. 1.”).
97 CLEVELAND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 48, at 260-61 (lamenting the
restrictive joinder jurisprudence under the codes and stating that “the wider joinder
permitted by the English rules,” which was facilitated by the “‘common question of law or
fact test[,]’ has been adopted and is stated in these rules”); see also ATLANTA BAR ASS’N,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ATLANTA INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 47-48
(1938) (“[Rule 20] is taken from the English practice . . . . We are going to save time if we
dispose of one or more questions affecting the whole crowd, whether those questions be of
fact or law. By this statement of the rule we also have the advantage of having the
authorities from England . . . .”).
98 197 P. 569 (Kan. 1921).
95
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should be exercised, either on behalf of a numerous body of separate
claimants against a single party, or on behalf of a single party against
such a numerous body, although there is no ‘common title,’ nor
‘community of right’ or of ‘interest in the subject-matter,’ among these
individuals, but where there is and because there is merely a community
of interest among them in the questions of law and fact involved in the
general controversy, or in the kind and form of relief demanded and
obtained by or against each individual member of the numerous body. In
a majority of the decided cases, this community of interest in the
questions at issue and in the kind of relief sought has originated from the
fact that the separate claims of all the individuals composing the body
arose by means of the same unauthorized, unlawful, or illegal act or
proceeding. Even this external feature of unity, however, has not always
existed, and is not deemed essential. Courts of the highest standing and
ability have repeatedly interfered and exercised this jurisdiction, where
the individual claims were not only legally separate, but were separate in
time, and each arose from an entirely separate and distinct transaction,
simply because there was a community of interest among all the
claimants in the question at issue and in the remedy.”99
Two things are worth observing here. First, Pomeroy counterposes
“community of right” to the “mere[] . . . community of interest among them in
the questions of law and fact involved in the general controversy,” affirming
the distinctiveness of the two concepts.100 Second, classes lacking such a
“community of right” – or, to use the language of the 1938 rule, a “right” that
is “joint, or common” – are approved if there are two other kinds
commonalities. Specifically, the last line of the quote – endorsing class
treatment when “each [claim] arose from an entirely separate and distinct
transaction, simply because there was a community of interest among all the
claimants in the question at issue and in the remedy” – reflects precisely the
type of class authorized by subparagraph (a)(3) in the 1938 version of Rule 23.
That clause permitted class actions when the rights to be enforced are “several,
and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and
common relief is sought.”101
All of this is to say that the 1938 rule speaks of three separate kinds of
commonality – common rights, common questions, and common relief –
which were not interchangeable concepts but rather focused attention on three
very different traits that could describe a collective of claimants. The sameinterest concept discussed above is the ancestor of the common rights
component of the 1938 version of Rule 23. As explained by the Advisory
99

Id. at 571 (emphasis added) (quoting 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 269 (4th ed.
1918)).
100 Id.
101 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (1938).

460

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:441

Committee note to the original rule,102 common rights were exemplified by
actions by policyholders of a common issuer of the policies,103 or in creditors’
suits.104 The meaning of relief is self-explanatory, simply referring to the
remedy that each class member seeks.105 However, “common relief” was not
treated as joint relief given the express context in which the term was used in
the 1938 rule: the enforcement of several rights that were not interdependent.
Rather, common relief was read to mean relief emanating from the same
source.106
Common questions are something different from common rights or common
relief. Legal or factual questions are issues presented to a court whose
resolution bears on the adjudication of the claims presented.107 The modifier
“common” simply means that those questions are shared across the collective
claims.108 The formulation of the English joinder rule aptly stated how one
might determine whether this kind of commonality exists: “[I]f such persons
brought separate actions any common question of law or fact would
arise . . . .”109 That is, one can take the following three-step approach to
determining whether common questions exist among the claims: (1) assume

102 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938) advisory committee’s note (providing cases illustrating
commonality, such as “an action to enforce rights held in common by policyholders against
the corporate issuer of the policies” and actions “dealing with the right held in common by
creditors to enforce the statutory liability of stockholders”).
103 See Hiram H. Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 MINN. L. REV. 34, 41
(1937) (“Where the right is given to all the creditors, and not to each individual creditor, and
the statute is said to contemplate a fund for the common benefit, the right may be classed as
common.”).
104 Blume, supra note 49, at 880 (“When the object of a creditors’ suit is to reach,
establish and administer assets in the hands of a trustee who holds them for the benefit of all
the creditors, the suit must be by all the creditors or by one or more for the benefit of all.”
(citation omitted)).
105 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1404 (9th ed. 2009) (defining relief as a “redress or
benefit . . . that a party asks of a court”).
106 Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 1952) (“Obviously, the
phrase ‘common relief,’ as used in the rule, was not intended to mean joint relief, for the
expressed purpose is to permit joinder of parties who have several or separable causes of
action. Hence to say that ‘common’ means ‘joint’ is to defeat the very purpose of the rule.
‘Common relief’ for persons having separate causes of action who may recover only several
judgments, it seems to us, must mean, in order to give life to the purpose of the rule, relief
emanating from the same original source . . . .”).
107 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 105, at 1366 (defining question as an “issue in
controversy; a matter to be determined”).
108 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2562 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Thus, a ‘question’ ‘common to the class’ must be
a dispute, either of fact or of law, the resolution of which will advance the determination of
the class members’ claims.”).
109 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (English), 1896, Order XVI, r. 1.
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each plaintiff proceeds separately; (2) identify all legal and factual questions
that would arise in the process of adjudicating each claim; and (3) determine
whether there is a question that would recur in each action.110
These distinctions between the three commonalities of the 1938 rule are
significant for our consideration of the Dukes interpretation of the
contemporary common question requirement because they reveal the
illegitimacy of the majority’s construction of that provision. The majority’s
effort to imbue Rule 23’s common question concept with a requirement that
class members share a common right or injury or that they seek common relief
unites concepts that the above discussion shows were meant to stand apart. We
will return to this point after completing our genealogy of the commonality
requirement with a discussion of the contemporary version of Rule 23.
B.

The Modern Version of Rule 23

What became of these three types of commonality – common rights,
common questions, and common relief – when Rule 23 was overhauled in
1966? In short, the amended version of Rule 23 abandoned two of the three, at
least nominally, preserving only the reference to common questions of law or
fact.111 The question is what to make of this development. The Advisory
Committee was explicit in explaining its excision of the “joint, or common”
right requirement: “In practice the terms ‘joint,’ ‘common,’ etc., which were
used as the basis of the Rule 23 classification proved obscure and
uncertain.”112 The Advisory Committee buttressed this assertion with extensive
citations to cases and commentary.113 The amended Rule 23 does not retain the
joint or common right requirement in any part of the rule.114
110

See, e.g., Payne v. British Time Recorder Co., [1921] 2 K.B. 1 (C.A.) 16-17 (Scrutton
L.J.) (Eng.) (“There is then the question common to both cases: Are the goods according to
this sample or not? If the two present defendants were not joined the result would be that
there would be two actions which would be set down to be heard together. An application
would then be made to the judge at the trial not to dispose of one of them until he had heard
the other, and the judge would endeavour to get in the evidence in both actions and exactly
the same result would follow as if the joinder of the two defendants were allowed.”); see
also Saltzman v. Pella Corp., 257 F.R.D. 471, 478 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“The determinative
question is whether the same issues would necessarily be re-litigated over and over again if
plaintiffs were required to bring separate actions.” (citing Joseph v. Gen. Motors Corp., 109
F.R.D. 635, 642 (D. Colo. 1986))).
111 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (1966) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if . . . (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class . . . .”).
112 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1966) advisory committee’s note.
113 Id. (citing law review articles and cases).
114 The closest the modern Rule 23 gets to those concepts is with its requirement that the
class representative’s claims be typical of the class claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). This
should not, however, be read as a requirement that the class representative and class
members seek to enforce “joint, or common” rights. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (1938).
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The fate of the “common relief” requirement in the 1966 amendment to
Rule 23 is more nuanced. Although the language disappeared with the
amendment, the idea of common versus individualized relief remained
relevant, at times, to the class certification analysis under the newly developed
predominance requirement, as well as when injunctive relief was being
sought.115 Taking the latter circumstance first, the 1966 rule endorsed class
treatment when “injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole” was appropriate.116 This is certainly a type of
“common relief” even though those words are not expressly used. Regarding
the connection with predominance, as individual class members move toward
seeking distinctive, individualized relief, some courts have treated the
propriety of class certification under those circumstances as a proper subject of
the predominance inquiry.117 The Advisory Committee Notes to the rule,
however, indicate that such an approach is improper.118 Regardless of how
courts treat the issue of individualized relief, it remains that with respect to the
prerequisites for class certification under the modern rule, seeking common
Typicality has been interpreted to mean that the class representative’s claim “is fairly
encompassed” within the claims of class members. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446
U.S. 318, 330 (1980) (“The typicality requirement is said to limit the class claims to those
fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff’s claims.”). Certainly, were plaintiffs enforcing a
joint right, the typicality standard would be satisfied. Given the Advisory Committee’s
express rejection of the concept of joint or common rights as useful in determining the
propriety of a class action, however, reading such concepts into the typicality requirement
would be inappropriate. Further, as a matter of simple English, typical was not synonymous
with joint, common, or “the same” but rather meant, “exhibiting the essential characteristics
of a group.” WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2751 (2d ed. 1960). In sum,
abandoning the common right language, disparaging it in the accompanying note, and then
introducing a new word of distinct English meaning taken together disqualified the
typicality-as-common-right interpretation as a legitimate reading of the rule.
115 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 93 (2003 & Supp. 2012) (“[T]he pursuit of
compensatory damages counsels against a finding of the predominance of questions
common to class members over questions affecting only individual members.”).
116 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (1966).
117 See, e.g., Robertson v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., No. C-03-2397, 2004 WL 5026265, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2004) (“Each member of the class will have a different measure of
damages based on a multitude of factors surrounding their particular move. These individual
questions will dominate trial of this action, both in terms of time and significance, which
demonstrates that this proposed class is not sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation.”).
118 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1966) advisory committee’s note (“[A] fraud perpetrated on
numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for
a class action, and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate
determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the class.”); see also 2 ALBA
CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:26 (4th ed. 2002) (citing
cases in support of the proposition that predominance is not undermined by the need for
individualized damage determinations).

2013]

HEIGHTENED COMMONALITY

463

relief is no longer a requirement save for the injunctive relief class under Rule
23(b)(2).
Of the three commonalities found within the 1938 version of the rule, then,
the sole survivor is the common question concept, found today within Rule
23(a)(2)’s requirement that “there are questions of law or fact common to the
class.”119 As has been shown, this language covers different ground than the
abjured common right and common relief requirements of the 1938 rule. As
also established above, the common question requirement found in Rule
23(a)(2) is no more than a simple requirement that there be issues for the
court’s determination that would arise in the adjudication of each class
member’s claims were they litigated separately. How did the Court stray from
these basic principles in expounding on the meaning of commonality in Dukes?
It is that question to which we now turn.
II.

DUKES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HEIGHTENED COMMONALITY

Prior to Dukes, federal courts had embraced a view of commonality
consistent with the meaning described above. The requirement was seen as
easy to satisfy, with the necessary showing being characterized as “minimal”120
and permissively construed.121 This is not to say that commonality was
regarded as no requirement at all; to the contrary, the common questions had to
pertain to an issue or issues that would “advance the litigation.”122 This made
sense, as the definition of a legal or factual question is “an issue in
controversy; a matter to be determined.”123 Obviously, the common question
has to be germane to the resolution of the class claims rather than extraneous;
otherwise, the question would not be a real one in the case. But the Dukes
majority went further than this, yielding an unrecognizable conception of
commonality that improperly blends disparate components of contemporary
and predecessor rules governing joinder and representative actions.

119

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998); Lewis Tree Serv.,
Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 211 F.R.D. 228, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he commonality
requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) is usually a minimal burden for a party to shoulder.”).
121 In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.
2008) (“Rule 23(a)’s requirement of commonality is a low bar, and courts have generally
given it a ‘permissive application.’” (quoting 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1763 (3d ed. 2005)));
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019 (“Rule 23(a)(2) has been construed permissively.”).
122 Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“It is not
every common question that will suffice, however; at a sufficiently abstract level of
generalization, almost any set of claims can be said to display commonality. What we are
looking for is a common issue the resolution of which will advance the litigation.”).
123 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 105, at 1366 (emphasis added).
120
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The Dukes Court set forth a new standard for commonality with three
requirements. First, claimants must “‘have suffered the same injury.’”124
Second, the common question must be “central to the validity of each one of
the claims.”125 Third, the common question must be one whose determination
will resolve a central issue “in one stroke” by “generat[ing] common answers
apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”126 This Article will refer to these
three requirements as the same injury, centrality, and efficiency
requirements.127 This Article will proceed with a discussion of how each of
these aspects of heightened commonality is problematic.
A.

The Same Injury Requirement

The Dukes majority was wrong to infuse commonality with a same injury
requirement for several reasons. The first is textual. Justice Scalia, who often
touts his fealty to the written text of enacted rules and statutes,128 displays none
of that discipline in Dukes. The language of Rule 23(a) – that “there are
questions of law or fact common to the class” – expresses no need for class
members to have suffered the “same injury.” Although a common injury
shared by the claimants would meet the requirement that there be questions
common to the class, Rule 23 nowhere mentions such a circumstance as one of
its prerequisites or otherwise indicates that such an injury is the sine qua non of
commonality. And according to the Court, it is the text of the rule that was
meant to govern, notwithstanding the Court’s superintending role over the
rules-amendment process.129 Other members of the Dukes majority have
124 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co.
of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)).
125 Id. (emphasis added).
126 Id.
127 Professor Effron also uses the term centrality in this context. Robin J. Effron, The
Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. 750, 802 (2012). She uses the term “resolvability”
for the aspects of the majority’s interpretation that this Article labels with the term
“efficiency.” Id.
128 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 22 (“The text is the law, and it is the text that must
be observed.”).
129 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (“And, of overriding
importance, courts must be mindful that the Rule as now composed sets the requirements
they are bound to enforce. Federal Rules take effect after an extensive deliberative process
involving many reviewers: a Rules Advisory Committee, public commenters, the Judicial
Conference, this Court, the Congress. The text of a rule thus proposed and reviewed limits
judicial inventiveness. Courts are not free to amend a rule outside the process Congress
ordered . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 514-15
(2002) (“Whatever the practical merits of this argument, the Federal Rules do not contain a
heightened pleading standard for employment discrimination suits. A requirement of greater
specificity for particular claims is a result that ‘must be obtained by the process of amending
the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.’” (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993))).
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similarly articulated a belief in adhering to the language of statutory texts when
interpreting them;130 yet that conviction was not in evidence in Dukes.
The absence of such language relates to the second problem with the
majority’s interpretation of commonality: the history of Rule 23 and its
antecedents discussed above reveal that a “same injury” test is a distinct
requisite that was eschewed by the drafters of the present rule.131 The 1938
version of Rule 23 permitted classes that sought to enforce “joint, or common”
rights.132 Under the codes, joinder was proper when parties were “united in
interest” or if they shared “an interest in the subject of the action” or
“controversy,”133 with representative actions being permissible when “the
question is one of a common or general interest.”134 The English representative
action rule allowed a plaintiff to represent absent claimants when they had “the
same interest in one cause or matter.”135 The Dukes majority’s “same injury”
requirement echoes these provisions. Injury refers to “the violation of another’s
legal right”;136 requiring all class members to have suffered the same legalrights violation is tantamount to requiring that “the right sought to be enforced
for . . . the class is . . . common,” the very requirement that failed to survive the
1966 revision of Rule 23.137 Similarly, the “same injury” gloss on commonality

130

See, e.g., Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 198-99 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“This Court’s interpretive function requires it to identify and give effect to the best reading
of the words in the provision at issue. Even if the proper interpretation of a statute upholds a
‘very bad policy,’ it ‘is not within our province to second-guess’ the ‘wisdom of Congress’
action’ . . . . ‘Our task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it.’” (citations omitted)
(quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U. S. 186, 222 (2003); Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t
Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989))); id. at 196 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“I entirely agree
with JUSTICE THOMAS that ‘Congress’ intent is found in the words it has chosen to use,’
and that ‘[o]ur task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it,’ even if that produces ‘very
bad policy.’” (quoting id. at 198-99 (Thomas, J., concurring))); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006) (Alito, J.) (“We have ‘stated time and
again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means
in a statute what it says there.’ When the statutory ‘language is plain, the sole function of the
courts – at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd – is to enforce it
according to its terms.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 253-54 (1992); Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S.
1, 6 (2000))).
131 See supra Part I. Note, however, that reference to the history of the rule is
unnecessary to derive its meaning since its language is plain and clear. Rather, the history is
used to reveal the illegitimacy of Justice Scalia’s interpretation of commonality in Dukes.
132 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (1938).
133 FIELD CODE, supra note 60, § 99; id. §§ 97, 98.
134 1849 N.Y. Laws ch. 438 § 119. For a discussion of joinder rules under the procedural
codes of the Nineteenth Century, see supra text accompanying notes 61-90.
135 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (English), 1896, Order XVI, r. 9.
136 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 105, at 856.
137 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) (1938).
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seems close kin to the “the same interest” requirement of the codes and English
practice,138 the very road not taken, as it were, when our contemporary Rule 23
was drafted.139 Certainly the common question concept, existing as it did as an
alternative to the common right requirement within the original Rule 23, or in
contrast to the same-interest requirement of English representative actions,
cannot – consistent with the historical uses of these various terms – be properly
treated as being now imbued with the very attributes of its former rivals to
which it was originally counterposed.
From where does Justice Scalia derive his “same injury” reading of
commonality, if not the text or history of the provision? In Dukes, Justice
Scalia twice declares that Rule 23(a) imposes a “same injury” requirement:
first when he writes, “[A] class representative must be part of the class and
‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members,”140
and again when he states, “Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’”141 Both of these
statements ultimately originate from Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War,142 which was an action challenging the military reserve
membership of Members of Congress as a violation of the Incompatibility
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.143 The key issue before the Court was whether
the Reservists Committee, which was attempting to bring this action on behalf
of four different classes of people, had Article III standing either as citizens or
taxpayers.144 Taking up the issue of citizen standing, the Court made the
following statement:

138

Indeed, Justice Scalia uses the same-interest language at the outset of his opinion in
Dukes: “[A] class representative must be part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and
suffer the same injury’ as the class members.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct.
2541, 2550 (2011) (quoting E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395,
403 (1977)).
139 See supra notes 63-92. Charles Clark and the Advisory Committee’s explicit
references to the English joinder rule rather than the English representative action rules as
the progenitor of the “common question” language in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
coupled with the rejection of the joinder language from the codes, can be interpreted as
testament to the deliberateness of the renunciation of the same interest standard. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 23 (1938) advisory committee’s notes.
140 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550 (quoting Motor Freight, 431 U.S. at 403).
141 Id. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156, 157
(1982)).
142 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
143 Id. at 210-11. The Incompatibility Clause refers to Article 1, section 6, clause 2 of the
U.S. Constitution: “No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which
shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such
time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either
House during his Continuance in Office.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
144 Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at at 215-16. In addition to their status as citizens and
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To have standing to sue as a class representative it is essential that a
plaintiff must be a part of that class, that is, he must possess the same
interest and suffer the same injury shared by all members of the class he
represents.145
The Court ultimately concluded that the Committee lacked citizen standing
because the only interest alleged was a generalized interest in constitutional
governance, an interest that was too abstract to serve as the predicate for
standing.146 What is important to observe for our purposes, however, is that
Schlesinger and the quoted language from the decision were about standing;
the case had nothing to do with Rule 23 or the commonality requirement.
In subsequent cases the Court has repeated this language beyond the
standing context, each time, as in the game of telephone, morphing it into
something unmoored from its original meaning. In East Texas Motor Freight
System, Inc. v. Rodriguez,147 the Court used Schlesinger’s same injury
language to declare class representatives ineligible to represent the class due to
their admission that they had not suffered any injury.148 That fact certainly
undermined their standing, although the Court did not explicitly couch the
concern in those terms. Rather, the Court cited to a string of cases that did
explicitly couch the defect in terms of standing and justiciability.149

taxpayers, the Committee attempted to base their standing on their status as military officers
and as opponents of the Vietnam War. Id. at 216. Because the district court rejected the
latter two bases, and the Committee did not challenge that ruling as error, those categories
were not before the Supreme Court. Id.
145 Id. at 216 (emphasis added) (citing Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div. v. Burney, 409 U.S. 540
(1973); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962)).
146 Id. at 220 (“[S]tanding to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind
alleged here which is held in common by all members of the public, because of the
necessarily abstract nature of the injury all citizens share.”).
147 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
148 Id. at 403-04 (“[T]hese [named] plaintiffs lacked the qualifications to be hired as line
drivers. Thus, they could have suffered no injury as a result of the alleged discriminatory
practices, and they were, therefore simply not eligible to represent a class of persons who
did allegedly suffer injury.”).
149 Id. at 403; see also Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 131 n.12 (1977) (“These
fragmented subclasses are represented by named plaintiffs whose constitutional claims are
moot . . . .”); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S.
752, 759 n.9 (1973) (“The petitioners, however, lack standing to raise these contentions.”);
Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 49 (1969) (“[N]othing in the Colorado legislative scheme as now
written adversely affects . . . their present interests . . . . [A]ppellants ‘cannot represent a
class of [which] they are not a part.’” (quoting Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33
(1962))); Bailey, 369 U.S. at 31-32 (“Appellants lack standing to enjoin criminal
prosecutions under Mississippi’s breach-of-peace statutes, since they do not allege that they
have been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under them.”).
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By the time this same injury language was repeated in General Telephone
Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,150 it was divorced from any reference, explicit
or implicit, to Article III justiciability concerns. Rather, sharing the “same
injury” was offered first as a freestanding requirement for determining the
propriety of a class representative and then as being a trait that demonstrated
commonality and typicality.151 The Falcon Court wrote: “We have repeatedly
held that ‘a class representative must be part of the class and “possess the same
interest and suffer the same injury” as the class members.’”152 As just
described, however, this requirement was drawn from cases addressing
standing, not commonality. Then, the Falcon Court added the following:
Conceptually, there is a wide gap between (a) an individual’s claim that
he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory grounds, and his
otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has a policy of
discrimination, and (b) the existence of a class of persons who have
suffered the same injury as that individual, such that the individual’s
claim and the class claims will share common questions of law or fact and
that the individual’s claim will be typical of the class claims.153
It is this formulation that Justice Scalia quoted in Dukes when he wrote,
“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members
‘have suffered the same injury.’”154 But that is not what the Falcon quote says.
Although one can read into this language an equation of commonality with
suffering from a common injury, it is better read to indicate that when a class
has suffered a common injury, the claims will share common questions of law
or fact. In other words, a class comprised of members who have suffered a
common injury is sufficient but not necessary to satisfy commonality.
Further, the Court in Falcon was expressly concerned with the unity
between the class representative’s claim and the claims of absent class
members, leading it to blend the commonality and typicality analysis155 and
explaining its comparisons between “the individual’s claim and the class
claims” in the excerpt above.156 As a result, the shadow of the typicality
concern permitted the freestanding commonality requirement to be subsumed
and enlarged simultaneously: the Falcon Court treated commonality as if it

150

457 U.S. 147, 156-57 (1982).
Id. at 156.
152 Id. (quoting Motor Freight, 431 U.S. at 403 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974)))).
153 Id. at 157.
154 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting Falcon, 457
U.S. at 157).
155 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13 (“The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule
23(a) tend to merge.”).
156 Id. at 157.
151
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were merely instrumental to determining typicality,157 while also offering the
language Justice Scalia subsequently used to expand the meaning of
commonality to require sufferance of the same injury.158 That Falcon was
about typicality – and not about pronouncing what would have been a radical
alteration of the commonality standard – is borne out by its subsequent effects
on lower court decisions. Lower courts in the wake of Falcon did not shift their
understanding of commonality but rather took Falcon principally as a
statement about typicality and the necessary connection that must exist
between the claims of class representatives and their respective classes.159 And
prior to Dukes, the Supreme Court cited Falcon for its statement on Rule
23(a)(4)’s adequacy-of-representation requirement, which it stated “tends to
merge with the commonality and typicality criteria of Rule 23(a).”160
Otherwise, the Court gave no indication that Falcon had redefined the
traditional understanding of commonality.
Ultimately, the “same injury” requirement spun by Justice Scalia is a
fabrication that imbues commonality with long-abandoned and eschewed
attributes. At best, such attributes might have been requisites of forming a
“true” class under former Rule 23(a)(1), or at worst they reflect an attempt to
align American class action standards with those for representative actions in
England.161 In any event, interpreting commonality to require the same injury
is an unsupportable move that the Court should reverse.

157

Id. at 158-59 (“Without any specific presentation identifying the questions of law or
fact that were common to the claims of respondent and of the members of the class he
sought to represent, it was error for the District Court to presume that respondent’s claim
was typical of other claims against petitioner . . . .”).
158 Id. at 157.
159 See, e.g., Wakefield v. Monsanto Co., 120 F.R.D. 112, 116 (E.D. Mo. 1988)
(“[C]onsistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Falcon, the typicality requirement is not
always satisfied by suits alleging broad-based racial discrimination. Relevant factors which
a court may consider in determining whether a sufficient community of interests exists to
make plaintiff’s claim typical of the class he or she seeks to represent include a comparison
between (i) plaintiff’s employment situation and that of the prospective class members, (ii)
the circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s grievance and those surrounding the prospective
class members’ grievances, and (iii) the relief sought by plaintiff and that sought by the
class.”).
160 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 n.20 (1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13). Interestingly, in the context of its
discussion of adequacy of representation, the Court trotted out the same quote from
Schlesinger highlighted in Dukes: “[A] class representative must be part of the class and
‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members.” Id. at 625-26
(quoting E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977) (quoting
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974))). It appears
that this language is quite useful and versatile, as it can be referenced to give meaning to
several of the distinct prerequisites found in Rule 23(a).
161 Under Rule 19.6 of the English Civil Procedure Rules, representative actions are
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The Centrality Requirement

The other two components of heightened commonality, centrality and
efficiency, are related to one another and are equally beyond the scope of what
Rule 23(a)(2)’s common question requirement contemplates. Centrality is
simply a kind of predominance by another name. The core and most important
issues in a case, the central issues, by definition “predominate over” less
important issues peripheral to the claims at hand.162 Thus, by redefining
commonality in a way that can only be satisfied when the shared questions are
central to the litigation, the Dukes majority, as Justice Ginsburg noted, was
quite transparently importing the predominance criterion from Rule 23(b)(3)
into the common question analysis.163 In addition to Justice Ginsburg’s critique
in the dissenting portions of her opinion in Dukes, Professor Robin Effron has
already quite ably addressed this phenomenon, which she refers to as “implied
predominance,”164 both in Dukes and beyond.165 I do not repeat their analyses
here but only add an observation.
The Court’s transmogrification of commonality into centrality (née
predominance) is a more objectionable adulteration of the “common question”
concept than was the alchemy that produced the same injury requirement.

appropriate “[w]here more than one person has the same interest in a claim.” CIV. P. R. 19.6
(2010) (Eng.).
162 See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 118, § 4:25 (expounding on the predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) and stating that “[a] single common issue may be the
overriding one in the litigation, despite the fact that the suit also entails numerous remaining
individual questions”).
163 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2562 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In so ruling, the Court imports into the Rule
23(a) determination concerns properly addressed in a Rule 23(b)(3) assessment.”).
164 Effron, supra note 127, at 799. I acknowledge Professor Effron’s view that “implied
predominance” and centrality can be distinguished. See id. She describes the former as
concerning the relationship between the common and individual issues, and the latter as
dealing with the relationship between the issue and the litigation. See id. Although
predominance can be a mere numbers game – meaning common issues can predominate if
they outnumber the individual issues, see, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust
Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding predominance because common issues
outnumbered individual issues) – this Article takes the position that the concepts can often
be inextricably intertwined. When undertaking a predominance analysis, a relevant
comparison between common and individual issues is their relative degrees of significance
to the claims before the court, more so than the mere number of issues of each kind. See
CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 118, § 4:25 (“A single common issue may be the overriding
one in the litigation, despite the fact that the suit also entails numerous remaining individual
questions.”).
165 Professor Effron discusses implied predominance in ordinary joinder contexts as well
as the class action context of Dukes, chronicling how some lower courts before Dukes were
wont to “read a predominance requirement into the definition of a common question of law
or fact.” See Effron, supra note 127, at 789-804.

2013]

HEIGHTENED COMMONALITY

471

Justice Scalia “relied” heavily on an article by the late Professor Richard
Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof.166 But in Justice
Scalia’s hands, Nagareda’s actual argument was unrecognizable. According to
Justice Scalia, Professor Nagareda was dismissive of the notion that the mere
presence of common questions was sufficient to warrant class treatment,
because “‘[a]ny competently crafted class complaint literally raises common
“questions.”’”167 Justice Scalia further buttressed the Court’s centrality thesis
by adopting the following quote from Professor Nagareda:
“What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common
‘questions’ – even in droves – but, rather the capacity of a classwide
proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the
potential to impede the generation of common answers.”168
The problem with Justice Scalia’s application of Professor Nagareda’s words is
that these words had absolutely nothing to do with the common question
requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). Rather, Professor Nagareda was speaking of the
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) and how analysis thereunder
should focus on dissimilarities among class claims.
One can see this from the following fuller excerpt from Professor
Nagareda’s article:
By its terms, Rule 23 speaks of common “questions” that
“predominate” over individual ones . . . .
The formulation of Rule 23 in terms of predominant common
“questions” and generally applicable misconduct obscures the crucial line
between dissimilarity and similarity within the class. The existence of
common “questions” does not form the crux of the class certification
inquiry, at least not literally, or else the first-generation case law would
have been correct to regard the bare allegations of the class complaint as
dispositive on the certification question. Any competently crafted class
complaint literally raises common “questions.” What matters to class
certification, however, is not the raising of common “questions” – even in
droves – but, rather, the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate
common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.
Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to
impede the generation of common answers.
. . . The language in Rule 23(b)(3) tends to obscure this point, however,
by asking whether “questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual [class]
166

Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 97, 131-32 (2009).
167 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (alteration in original) (quoting Nagareda, supra note 166,
at 131-32).
168 Id. (quoting Nagareda, supra note 166, at 132).
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members.” Heaps of similarities do not overcome dissimilarities that
would prevent common resolution.169
Although it is clear that Professor Nagareda’s discussion suggested that the
presence of common questions of law or fact was not sufficient for class
certification, that is a mere truism, for commonality is but one of several
requirements for class certification in Rule 23. Professor Nagareda’s real point
was that predominance is the key and it should be interpreted in a way that
permits critical dissimilarities to undermine certification even in the presence
of “droves” of common questions that are less central. That is certainly a
valuable insight that the Court might be advised to consider the next time it is
tasked with interpreting the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). But
turning this suggested understanding of predominance into the equivalent of
commonality itself was in no way Professor Nagareda’s end or something that
his article’s language supports. Nowhere does Professor Nagareda use his
formulation to suggest that no common questions exist within the meaning of
Rule 23(a)(2). He argues instead that predominance properly construed would
look to what is uncommon among the class and evaluate the ability of those
differences to frustrate the benefits of class treatment.170
The Court’s commonality-as-centrality interpretation can thus draw no
comfort from being derived from some other source, let alone from the text of
the rule.171 Instead, it is the Dukes majority’s own creation. Rather than
amending the rule to reflect this approach, however, the Court found it more
convenient to let a revised “interpretation” of commonality accomplish the
same end, a technique it recently showcased in the Rule 8 context.172
Unfortunately, requiring common questions to be central ones will now require
169 Nagareda, supra note 166, at 131-32 (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3)).
170 Dean Klonoff aptly criticizes Justice Scalia’s misrepresentation of Professor
Nagareda’s position on commonality by highlighting the latter’s work on the ALI’s
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation project. See Klonoff, supra note 22
(manuscript at 52). The portions of those principles authored by Professor Nagareda affirm
the traditional understanding of commonality as a minimal requirement that did not demand
issues whose disposition would resolve all contested issues in the litigation. See id.
(manuscript at 51-53) (“Common issues are those legal or factual issues that are the same in
functional content across multiple civil claims, regardless of whether their disposition
would resolve all contested issues in the litigation.” (emphasis added) (quoting PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.01 (2010))).
171 The textual arguments offered above, see supra text accompanying notes 128-30,
apply equally to the Court’s centrality requirement and need not be repeated here.
172 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S 662, 677-80 (2009) (applying Twombly’s narrow
interpretation of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a plaintiff’s claim
for lack of “facial plausibility”); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007)
(interpreting Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require factual allegations
sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” in contrast with prior
caselaw interpreting Rule 8 more broadly).
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courts to spin their wheels to refine the meaning of “central,” a topic on which
wide disagreements are certain to emerge. More disturbingly, the centrality
requirement will permit courts to disregard common questions of law or fact
that plainly exist and can be easily described, a liberty taken by the Dukes
majority itself.173 Further, reinterpreting commonality in this way exports
predominance outside of the Rule 23(b)(3) damages class context into being
relevant to the certification of all kinds of classes under the guise of
commonality.174 That inappropriately ratchets up the class certification
standards for mandatory classes and makes it more difficult for such classes to
succeed.175
C.

The Efficiency Requirement

We turn finally to the “in one stroke” efficiency requirement of heightened
commonality. This requirement is merely the cousin of the centrality
requirement, as efficiency increases in proportion to the significance of the
common questions that are present. As is the case with centrality, efficiency is
an attribute reflected in the predominance criterion of Rule 23(b)(3). Observe
the Advisory Committee’s explanation of predominance in its notes to the
adoption of the 1966 amendment to Rule 23:

173

Here are some of the common questions of law or fact that were present in Dukes but
were ignored as insufficient under the heightened commonality rule pronounced by the
majority in that case: do local Wal-Mart managers exercise discretion over pay and
promotion decisions in a manner that leads to a disparate adverse impact on female
employees? Is Wal-Mart aware of this effect? Does Wal-Mart’s awareness of this effect
constitute disparate treatment under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)? Does Wal-Mart have a
uniform company policy requiring a willingness to relocate as a prerequisite of promotion to
management jobs? Does that policy have a disparate impact on women? Is such disparate
impact unlawful under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)? The district court in Dukes discussed
several common questions, including whether “Wal-Mart’s policies governing
compensation and promotions build in a common feature of excessive subjectivity which
provides a conduit for gender bias.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 137, 145
(N.D. Cal. 2004); see also Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2564 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The District Court’s identification of a common question, whether WalMart’s pay and promotions policies gave rise to unlawful discrimination, was hardly
infirm.”); id. at 2565 (“The Court gives no credence to the key dispute common to the class:
whether Wal-Mart’s discretionary pay and promotion policies are discriminatory.”).
174 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561-62 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“In so ruling, the Court imports into the Rule 23(a) determination concerns properly
addressed in a Rule 23(b)(3) assessment.”); id. at 2566 (“Because Rule 23(a) is also a
prerequisite for Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) classes, the Court’s ‘dissimilarities’
position is far reaching. Individual differences should not bar a Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule
23(b)(2) class, so long as the Rule 23(a) threshold is met.”).
175 Id. at 2565 (“The Court blends Rule 23(a)(2)’s threshold criterion with the more
demanding criteria of Rule 23(b)(3), and thereby elevates the (a)(2) inquiry so that it is no
longer ‘easily satisfied.’” (quoting MOORE, supra note 11, § 23.23[2])).
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The court is required to find, as a condition of holding that a class
action may be maintained under this subdivision, that the questions
common to the class predominate over the questions affecting individual
members. It is only where this predominance exists that economies can be
achieved by means of the class-action device.176
This is not to say that other class certification prerequisites do not speak to
efficiency or that it is only through requiring predominance that efficiency is
secured.177 Hoping that resolution of common questions will “‘generate
common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation’”178 is not an
illegitimate goal per se, it just happens not to be what defines the meaning of
commonality. Put differently, the spirit of Rule 23(a)(2) may be to achieve a
certain end, efficiency. But that is a separate question from what the text of the
rule says and requires. In the presence of ambiguity, it may become profitable
to consult the policy behind a rule to comprehend its meaning. As Justice
Scalia himself has admonished, however, “[W]hen the text of the rule is clear,
that is the end of the matter.”179 Certainly no ambiguity presents itself in Rule
23(a)(2), which requires a “question” that is “common” to the class. Rather
than follow his own textualist diktats, Justice Scalia pronounces efficiency as
the objective policed by the commonality rule, then uses that to banish those
common questions that do little to further efficiency from its ambit, without
regard to the fact that commonality, not efficiency, is the unambiguous
requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).180 The result is the very “practical threat” that
Justice Scalia identified as flowing from the exaltation of intent over text: “The
practical threat is that, under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing
unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their
own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking proclivities from the
common law to the statutory field.”181 Well stated, and apropos of Dukes.
* * *

176

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (1966) advisory committee’s note.
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982) (“Both
[commonality and typicality] serve as guideposts for determining whether under the
particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named
plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class
members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.”).
178 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Nagareda, supra note 166, at
132).
179 Scalia, supra note 1, at 16.
180 Cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974) (“The short answer to
these arguments is that individual notice to identifiable class members is not a discretionary
consideration to be waived in a particular case. It is, rather, an unambiguous requirement of
Rule 23.”).
181 Scalia, supra note 1, 17-18.
177
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A class should certainly not be certified merely because it presents common
questions of law or fact, even in “droves.” It may also be readily conceded that
class certification is appropriate when important issues unite class claims or
when class members all suffer the same injury. But Rule 23 does not make
class certification turn on the basis of common questions alone, nor does it
limit its use to circumstances in which class members are bound only by the
central issue in the case. More important, the common question provision of
Rule 23 imposes not one of the requirements that characterize heightened
commonality after Dukes. In taking this approach, the Court is reviving the
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century tradition under the codes of giving
strict, narrowing constructions to statutory texts expressly drafted and designed
to liberalize joinder.182 As discussed further in Part III, this revival is reflective
of a wider move toward restrictiveness in civil procedure.
III. HEIGHTENED COMMONALITY AND THE RESTRICTIVE ETHOS IN CIVIL
PROCEDURE
In a previous article,183 I described what I call the “restrictive ethos” in civil
procedure – to be contrasted with the “liberal ethos” of the Progressive-era
civil rulemakers184 – as the contemporary theme underlying certain procedural
doctrines and rule interpretations that disserve access to civil justice.185

182 See Recent Trends in Joinder of Parties, Causes, and Counterclaims, 37 COLUM. L.
REV. 462, 470 (1937) (“[J]udicial construction [of the codes] has narrowly confined both the
broad provisions for joinder of parties and the terms ‘arising out of the same transaction’ . . .
so as to resurrect common law distinctions.” (footnote omitted)).
183 Spencer, supra note 43, at 353-54.
184 Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986) (“Dean Clark and the other drafters of the
Federal Rules set out to devise a procedural system that would install what may be labeled
the ‘liberal ethos,’ in which the preferred disposition is on the merits, by jury trial, after full
disclosure through discovery.” (citing Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH.
U. L.Q. 297, 318-19 (1938))); Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors
Closing? What’s Happened to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
587, 587-88 (2011) (“When the Federal Rules were promulgated – that was in 1938, over 70
years ago – they had a very liberal ethos to them. As a result, the Rules established a
relatively plainly worded, non-technical procedural system. The rulemakers believed in
citizen access to the courts and in the resolution of disputes on their merits.” (footnotes
omitted)).
185 Spencer, supra note 43, at 353-54; see also Laurens Walker, The Other Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 25 REV. LITIG. 79, 80-81 (2006) (“[T]he rich context of common law
procedural rules that function in conjunction with the 1938 Rules to determine the actual
function of the federal district courts has not yet received any systematic analysis and
comment. Among these background rules are, for example, heightened pleading
requirements, the burdens of production and persuasion, and the doctrine of res judicata.
These Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rules are the subject of this article. My thesis
is straightforward: The Other Rules interact with the 1938 Rules in such a way as to counter
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Specifically, restrictive procedural doctrines are those reflective of a bias
against claimants from societal outgroups asserting disfavored claims against
members of the dominant class.186 This bias manifests itself in a threshold
skepticism that raises the bar for entry into the judicial system in these cases,
frustrating the ability of such claimants to reach an authoritative resolution of
their claims on the merits.187 In Dukes we have a new specimen of this
phenomenon that both buttresses and helps to further explicate the
restrictiveness thesis. It does so in three ways.
A.

Threshold Skepticism

The Dukes majority indicated that a “rigorous” analysis of the evidence
supporting commonality was necessary,188 with the employment discrimination
context demanding “significant proof” of a general policy of discrimination.189
By endorsing a “rigorous” probe into the proofs offered by the plaintiffs of
their collective claims, the Dukes majority demonstrated threshold skepticism,
using its prejudgments about the merits as a guide to its resolution of the
procedural question before it. Threshold skepticism190 demands that before a
court permits defendants to be subjected to the litigation process itself – which
is generally derided as being so expensive as to coerce undeserved settlements
– claimants must demonstrate, up front, that their claims have merit.191 The

the apparent progressive character of the 1938 Rules and produce a functioning system
which is not progressive in reality but conservative.”).
186 I have previously cited the heightened pleading doctrine emanating from the Twombly
and Iqbal cases as an example. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward
Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 200 (2010) (“Iqbal reflects a certain
judicial mood toward litigation, an attitude of hostility and skepticism toward supplicants
with alleged grievances against the government or against the powerful who make up the
dominant class.”).
187 Spencer, supra note 43, at 359-66 (describing procedural doctrines that reflect
threshold skepticism); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431,
460 (2008) (arguing that the heightened pleading standard of Twombly will “creat[e] a class
of disfavored actions in which plaintiffs will face more hurdles to obtaining a resolution of
their claims on the merits”).
188 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (“We recognized in
Falcon that ‘sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings
before coming to rest on the certification question,’ and that certification is proper only if
‘the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have
been satisfied.’” (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160, 161
(1982))).
189 Id. at 2553.
190 This Article’s discussion of “threshold skepticism” is to be distinguished from the
idea of the majority’s skepticism of discrimination claims per se. It addresses the latter type
of skepticism in its discussion of the Court’s bias against claimants from outgroups and
treatment of discrimination claims as disfavored actions. See infra Part III.C.
191 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557-58 (2007)
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majority exhibited such skepticism in Dukes by assessing the value and weight
of the evidence presented by the class members regarding their discrimination
claims and found the evidence completely wanting: “Because respondents
provide no convincing proof of a companywide discriminatory pay and
promotion policy, we have concluded that they have not established the
existence of any common question.”192
The problem with this approach is that it seems to run counter to the Court’s
previous pronouncement in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin193 that “nothing in
either the language or history of Rule 23 [] gives a court any authority to
conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine
whether it may be maintained as a class action.”194 Further, no matter how
“rigorous” such merits reviews are purported to be, in truth they are cursory
quick peeks that not only fail to measure up to the thorough consideration of
the merits that district courts can provide, but they also improperly displace
them. Even in the class context, appellate courts are not in the position to
provide de novo review of factual evidence, giving their own assessments
without regard to the findings of the district court.195 This is especially so at the
certification stage, where an appellate court may cherry-pick facts from an
underdeveloped factual record in support of its commonality assessment.
Though an appellate-level merits review is inevitably less thorough and sound
than that which can be provided by the district court, the Dukes majority
engaged in what it considered to be a “rigorous” search for “significant proof”
of a general policy of discrimination.196 That meant a heightened evidentiary
standard was being imposed in the context of a preliminary, yet appellate,
review of the facts, something that was unfair to the plaintiffs.197 To the extent
(“[S]omething beyond the mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged, lest a plaintiff
with ‘a largely groundless claim’ be allowed to ‘take up the time of a number of other
people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement
value.’” (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U. S. 336, 347 (2005))).
192 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556-57.
193 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
194 Id. at 177; see also id. at 178 (“‘In determining the propriety of a class action, the
question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail
on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.’” (quoting Miller v.
Mackey Int’l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1971))).
195 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2564 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Appellate review is no occasion to disturb a trial court’s handling of factual disputes of
this order.”); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 703 (1979) (“[M]ost issues arising under
Rule 23 [are] committed in the first instance to the discretion of the district court.”).
196 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553. The majority quoted favorably Falcon’s requirement of
showing “‘[s]ignificant proof that an employer operated under a general policy of
discrimination.’” Id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15
(1982)).
197 Cf. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178 (“Additionally, we might note that a preliminary
determination of the merits may result in substantial prejudice to a defendant, since of
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the Dukes majority is endorsing a rigorous review of factual questions that
otherwise would warrant jury treatment, this approach echoes the jurydisplacing effects of the Court’s restrictive moves in the areas of summary
judgment198 and pleading doctrine.199 In making this endorsement, the Dukes
majority acknowledged that a likely post-certification settlement will preempt
most jury trials in the class action context.200 In any event, merely requiring
such proof at the certification stage raises the cost of certification and
diminishes the chance of successful certification.201
What is more fundamentally wrong with this threshold skepticism is its
infusion into the commonality analysis. A court may rightfully be skeptical of
class certification and take all necessary steps to ensure that claims have merit
before permitting them to proceed, provided that the procedural hurdle at issue
makes the merits relevant.202 But resting such skepticism on the back of a
requirement as simple and straightforward as one that asks only for “questions
of law or fact common to the class” is going too far. And that is the point:
Threshold skepticism is not objectionable per se; what makes it illegitimate is
when innocent provisions are conscripted into service of its ends. As the Court
at another time concluded, it would be better to use the process for formally
amending the rule than to infuse it with an alien reading to suit its members’
policy prerogatives,203 even if such policy is to make sure that the

necessity it is not accompanied by the traditional rules and procedures applicable to civil
trials. The court’s tentative findings, made in the absence of established safeguards, may
color the subsequent proceedings and place an unfair burden on the defendant.”).
198 See Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV.
139, 144 (2007).
199 See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 1851, 1867-68 (2008).
200 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551-52; see also Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d
672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[A]n order certifying a class usually is the district judge’s last
word on the subject; there is no later test of the decision’s factual premises (and, if the case
is settled, there could not be such an examination even if the district judge viewed the
certification as provisional). Before deciding whether to allow a case to proceed as a class
action, therefore, a judge should make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary
under Rule 23.”).
201 See Rutherglen, supra note 33, at 29 (stating that “requiring such evidence raises the
cost to the plaintiffs of obtaining a favorable ruling on certification” and diminishes the
prospect of certification).
202 See George Rutherglen, The Way Forward After Wal-Mart 3 (Virginia Pub. Law and
Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 2012-56, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=21
47955 (“Even such seemingly ‘trans-substantive’ requirements as adequacy of
representation can be implemented only by reference to substantive law. Whether there are
conflicts of interest within the class, or whether the class attorney can effectively represent
the class, cannot be decided without considering substantive law.”).
203 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 514-15 (2002) (“Whatever the
practical merits of this argument, the Federal Rules do not contain a heightened pleading
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consequential decision of permitting a class to go forward is only done when
there is some assurance that the plaintiffs’ claims are meritorious. In the end,
what is troubling about this kind of threshold skepticism and the restrictive
ethos in general is that it operates sub terra. Rules are not formally amended so
that movement in the desired direction can be debated and vetted, transparent
and democratic; rather, rules are contorted to mean what they do not say to
dictate a result desired by their interpreters, not their drafters. Two plus two
equals five.204
B.

Disfavored Actions

The second way in which Dukes exemplifies the restrictive ethos in civil
procedure is that it heightens entry standards in the context of discrimination
claims, a type of claim that historically has been treated as disfavored,205
particularly when advanced by members of outgroups.206 From motions for
sanctions under Rule 11, to summary judgment motions, to pleading standards,

standard for employment discrimination suits. A requirement of greater specificity for
particular claims is a result that ‘must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal
Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.’” (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993))). Indeed, a proposal to
amend Rule 23 to permit explicit evaluation of the merits as part of the certification stage
was considered but never approved by the Advisory Committee. Memorandum from Patrick
E. Higginbotham, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Members of the Standing
Comm. on Rules (Dec. 13, 1995), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndP
olicies/rules/Reports/CV12-1995.pdf (discussing a proposed draft amendment of Rule
23(b)(3) that would have required a consideration of whether “the prospect of success on the
merits of the class claims, issues, or defenses is sufficient to justify the costs and burdens
imposed by certification”).
204 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 69 (New American Library 1981) (1949) (“In the end, the
Party would announce that two and two made five and you would have to believe it.”).
205 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52
HOW. L.J. 99, 111-18 (2008) (discussing the history of heightened pleading in the context of
civil rights claims); id. at 141 (“Particularized fact-pleading of the kind prevalent prior to
Swierkiewicz and resurgent during the period leading up to Twombly seems to have persisted
as the standard of pleading applied by many, if not most, lower federal courts in civil rights
cases.”).
206 When discrimination claims are asserted by members of dominant groups – white
Americans in this country – the Court seems much more solicitous. See, e.g., Parents
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 710-11 (2007) (Roberts,
C.J., plurality opinion) (upholding a challenge by parents of white children of the Seattle
school system’s race-conscious school assignment system); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244, 275-76 (2003) (upholding a challenge by rejected white applicants to the University of
Michigan’s use of race in its admissions process); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 271 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (upholding challenge by rejected white
medical school applicant of the school’s use of race in its admissions process). For an
elaboration on this point, see infra Part III.C.
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employment discrimination claims207 have faced a gauntlet of procedural
hurdles that otherwise do not apply to civil actions.208 Why are discrimination
claims disfavored? At bottom, it appears that jurists who disfavor these claims
do so because they do not believe in them. They seem to espouse a deep
suspicion of, or at least a doubt concerning, claims of mistreatment tied to a
person’s race or gender, believing that the vast majority of people do not
discriminate and instead treat each other fairly.209 Explicit evidence of racial
animus is demanded before this presumption can be overcome.210 This is a
Pollyannish, counter-factual worldview211 but appears to be widely held.212 For

207 This ratcheting up of procedural requirements has not been confined to employment
discrimination claims, but rather has occurred with respect to other disfavored actions as
well. Spencer, supra note 43, at 371 (“Other actions have been ‘disfavored’ as well;
malicious prosecution, civil-rights claims, securities claims, and antitrust claims have been
treated by various courts throughout the history of the Federal Rules as disfavored and thus
warranting a heightened pleading standard.”).
208 See id. (describing the heightened scrutiny given to employment discrimination
claims in these contexts).
209 See Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work and Choice: An
Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job
Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1180 (1992) (“After a decade of efforts to enforce
Title VII, federal judges apparently began to share the general public’s belief that
employment discrimination against minorities had been largely eradicated.”); see also
Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedural Hurdles in the Quest for Justice, 37 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 621, 624-25 (2011) (“With the election of Barack Obama, the first African
American President, there has been a particularly acute focus on whether American society
has become ‘post-racial.’ Following this historic election, many Americans have concluded
that race discrimination is no longer a significant issue. Consequently, some judges, like
many other Americans, may operate from the presumption that race discrimination is a thing
of the past.” (footnotes omitted)).
210 See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56
ALA. L. REV. 741, 789-90 (2005); id. at 789 n.258 (“In the early years of [Title VII’s]
application, courts tended to operate on the assumption that if an employment decision was
unexplained, or the explanation made no sense or lacked support, it was likely that the
decision involved discrimination. That assumption has shifted, and many judges today
instead presume that the employer who is unwilling or unable to explain a decision may
have acted with personal animosity – which is not prohibited by law – rather than
discriminatory animus.” (citation omitted)); see also Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302
F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (“The judicial focus on the search for
unconstitutional discriminatory animus obscures the fact that it is possible that the board
chose the individual it perceived to be the ‘best’ candidate and, yet still, that Thomas was
subjected to discrimination; the two are not mutually exclusive.”).
211 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324-25 (1987) (“By insisting that a
blameworthy perpetrator be found before the existence of racial discrimination can be
acknowledged, the Court creates an imaginary world where discrimination does not exist
unless it was consciously intended.”).
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example, Chief Justice John Roberts’s remark that “[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race”213 evinces his oblivity to the existence of covert or unintentional
discrimination that is preconscious,214 mediated by some other trait,215 or
derivative of classifications or assumptions that are neither gender nor race
based.216
The last-mentioned of these types of discrimination to which Chief Justice
Roberts is oblivious characterizes the kinds of claims advanced by the Dukes

212 See, e.g., K.A. DIXON ET AL., JOHN J. HELDRICH CTR. FOR WORKFORCE DEV., A
WORKPLACE DIVIDED: HOW AMERICANS VIEW DISCRIMINATION AND RACE ON THE JOB 8
(2002), available at http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/content/A_Workplac
e_Divided.pdf (“Half of African-American workers believe that African Americans are
treated unfairly in the workplace compared to 10% of white workers, and 13% of workers
from other racial backgrounds.”); id. at 14 (finding that only 6% of white workers believe
that promotions are awarded in a way that is unfair to African Americans, compared with
46% of African Americans who share that belief); see also Suzette M. Malveaux, Front
Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental
Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 93-94 (2010)
(discussing this view and citing several reports and other sources in support).
213 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
214 See Kerry Kawakami, Kenneth L. Dion & John F. Dovidio, Implicit Stereotyping and
Prejudice and the Primed Stroop Task, 58 SWISS J. PSYCHOL. 241, 246-47 (1999) (“[T]he
present study offers further evidence that racial stereotypes and attitudes can be activated
without intention.”); see also Hart, supra note 210, at 743 (“Contemporary sociological and
psychological research reveals that discriminatory biases and stereotypes are pervasive,
even among well-meaning people. In fact, recent studies have focused particular attention
on the unconscious biases of people whose consciously held beliefs are strongly
egalitarian.”). In her Dukes opinion, Justice Ginsburg remarked that “[m]anagers, like all
humankind, may be prey to biases of which they are unaware” and cited a study on blind
auditions for orchestras as an example. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2563 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Claudia Goldin
& Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female
Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 715-16 (2000)).
215 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM.
ECON. REV. 991, 991 (2004) (“White names receive 50 percent more callbacks for
interviews [than African American sounding names]. Callbacks are also more responsive to
resume quality for White names than for African American ones. The racial gap is uniform
across occupation, industry, and employer size. We also find little evidence that employers
are inferring social class from the names. Differential treatment by race still appears to still
be prominent in the U.S. labor market.”).
216 See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Absent instruction otherwise, there is a risk that managers will act on the familiar
assumption that women, because of their services to husband and children, are less mobile
than men.” (citing FED. GLASS CEILING COMM’N, DEP’T OF LABOR, GOOD FOR BUSINESS:
MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL 151 (1995))).
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plaintiffs: “Wal-Mart has maintained a ‘willingness to relocate’ prerequisite for
promotion to management which has had a disparate impact on plaintiffs and
the class they represent.”217 The Dukes plaintiffs also sought to challenge
implicit gender bias that manifested itself through the policy of excessive
subjective decisionmaking with respect to pay and promotion decisions,
something the Court had previously suggested it understood to be a problem
that a Title VII claim could address:
[I]t may be customary and quite reasonable simply to delegate
employment decisions to those employees who are most familiar with the
jobs to be filled and with the candidates for those jobs. It does not follow,
however, that the particular supervisors to whom this discretion is
delegated always act without discriminatory intent. Furthermore, even if
one assumed that any such discrimination can be adequately policed
through disparate treatment analysis, the problem of subconscious
stereotypes and prejudices would remain. . . . If an employer’s
undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has precisely the same
effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination,
it is difficult to see why Title VII’s proscription against discriminatory
actions should not apply. In both circumstances, the employer’s practices
may be said to “adversely affect [an individual’s] status as an employee,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
We conclude, accordingly, that subjective or discretionary employment
practices may be analyzed under the disparate impact approach in
appropriate cases.218
Certainly, the “problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices” belies
Chief Justice Roberts’s simplistic admonition to just “stop” discriminating so
that discrimination may end.
Justice Scalia, too, is hobbled by this naïve mindset, which he showcases in
his crabbed commonality analysis in Dukes. Having declared that central
common questions are the only ones that suffice, Justice Scalia demands that
the plaintiffs prove one of two commonalities to demonstrate employment
discrimination. Plaintiffs may either show use of “a biased testing procedure”
that prejudiced all class members or offer “significant proof that an employer
operated under a general policy of discrimination.”219 With the former not
being implicated in the case, attention focused on the policy question. Justice
Scalia concluded that because “Wal-Mart’s announced policy forbids sex
discrimination” and the presence of a gender-biased corporate culture could
not be demonstrated to his satisfaction, no “significant proof” of a

217

Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 22.
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-91 (1988) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982)).
219 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553.
218
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discriminatory policy existed.220 The only evidence of a policy that Justice
Scalia credited was Wal-Mart’s policy of permitting local supervisors to
exercise discretion regarding pay and promotion decisions. In the context of
such discretion, however, Justice Scalia baldly posits that discrimination is
unlikely in most cases: “[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any
corporation – and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex
discrimination – would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring
and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.”221 Apparently not:
Women fill 70 percent of the hourly jobs in [Wal-Mart’s] stores but make
up only 33 percent of management employees. The higher one looks in
the organization the lower the percentage of women. The plaintiffs’
largely uncontested descriptive statistics also show that women working
in the company’s stores are paid less than men in every region and that
the salary gap widens over time even for men and women hired into the
same jobs at the same time.222
Notwithstanding these facts, because of Justice Scalia’s belief that intentional
discrimination is only personal unless it can be evidenced by “significant
proof” of some formal discriminatory policy, he concludes that “[a] party
seeking to certify a nationwide class will be unable to show that all the
employees’ Title VII claims will in fact depend on the answers to common
questions.”223
Ultimately, serious doubts about the existence of group bias within an
organization that is pervasive, cultural, and unconscious or condoned – but not
always express – is what made the Dukes claims disfavored and
misunderstood. That attitude, in turn, yielded a disbelief that important
commonalities could exist, since discrimination is personal and must be
detected on a case-by-case basis absent a formal, global policy. By ratcheting
up commonality to require central common questions and then defining what
that question must be in the employment-discrimination context, the Dukes
majority was able to operationalize its doubt-of-group-bias perspective under
the guise of the common question requirement and forestall the prosecution of
these disfavored claims.224
220

Id. at 2553-54.
Id. at 2554.
222 Id. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
223 Id. at 2254 (majority opinion).
224 The majority may have also reshaped Title VII law in rejecting the sufficiency of
disparate impact in the context of a discretionary system to establish unlawful
discrimination. Compare id. at 2555 (“[P]roving that [a] discretionary system has produced
a . . . disparity is not enough.”), with id. at 2565 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (discussing a prior decision holding that an “employer’s ‘undisciplined
system of subjective decisionmaking’ was an ‘employment practice’ that ‘may be analyzed
under the disparate impact approach.’” (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
221
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Anti-Claimant Bias and Outgroups as Class Claimants

A final but lesser point related to the treatment of disfavored claims is that
Dukes seems to confirm that component of the restrictiveness thesis that posits
a bias against the types of plaintiffs who typically bring such claims: members
of societal outgroups. Members of societal outgroups are “those outside the
political and cultural mainstream, particularly those challenging accepted legal
principles and social norms . . . . [T]hose raising difficult and often tenuous
claims that demand the reordering of established political, economic and social
arrangements, that is, those at the system’s and society’s margins.”225 The
restrictive ethos thesis suggests that when plaintiffs from such groups are pitted
against societal insiders, procedure is interpreted in ways that thwart the
plaintiffs’ efforts.226 That is fairly descriptive of what happened in Dukes,
which involved female employees complaining of discrimination in pay and
promotion decisions by managerial personnel of Wal-Mart, the largest
corporation in the world.227 Women have historically been discriminated
against in the employment context228 and continue to endure pay disparities229

U.S. 977, 990-91 (1988))). Professor Rutherglen has also made this observation. See
Rutherglen, supra note 201, at 5 (“In the end, the decision in Wal-Mart may come to stand
as much for its insistence on the strict standards of proof for class claims under Title VII as
for its interpretation of the requirements of Rule 23.”). Analyzing the impact of Dukes on
Title VII law is beyond the scope of this Article.
225 Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for
Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 345 (1990).
226 Spencer, supra note 43, at 353-54.
227 Global 500, FORTUNE (July 25, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/globa
l500/2011/snapshots/2255.html.
228 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-86 (1973) (“It is true, of course, that
the position of women in America has improved markedly in recent decades. Nevertheless,
it can hardly be doubted that, in part because of the high visibility of the sex characteristic,
women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination in our educational
institutions, in the job market and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003)
(“[T]he States’ record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based
discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the
enactment of prophylactic § 5 legislation.”); The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1987:
Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations & Subcomm. on
Labor Standards of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong. 235 (1987) (statement
of Donna Lenhoff, Assoc. Dir. for Legal Pol’y & Programs, Women’s Legal Defense Fund)
(“Historically, denial or curtailment of women’s employment opportunities has been
traceable directly to the pervasive presumption that women’s place is in the home.”).
229 WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON WOMEN & GIRLS, KEEPING AMERICA’S WOMEN MOVING
FORWARD: THE KEY TO AN ECONOMY BUILT TO LAST, at i (2012) (“[W]omen still make just
77 cents for every dollar men make . . . .”); see also STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 111TH
CONG., WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY 2010: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN
1 (Comm. Print 2010) (“[T]he average full-time working woman earns only 80 cents for
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and glass ceilings.230 Thus, in Dukes, when a massive group of working-class
women presented quite plausible support for the idea that gender
discrimination permeates the pay and promotion practices of a company the
size of Wal-Mart, a majority of the Court found a way to thwart their claims.
The Court did so not by confronting them on the merits, but by using an
adulteration of the common question requirement for the task. And that is what
characterizes the restrictive ethos: insider bias against claimants from societal
outgroups feeds into interpreting procedure to raise the standards for entry in a
way that aborts outsider claims ab initio.231 Certainly, this point regarding anticlaimant bias could be rightly characterized as an intuition; the point here,
however, is to highlight Dukes as an additional data point in the ongoing
analysis of whether such a bias indeed exists. Time will tell, but for now
suffice it to say that Dukes fits this aspect of the restrictiveness critique.
Contrast this treatment of outsider plaintiffs with the solicitude that
defendant corporations tend to receive in the face of the slightest litigation
adversity. In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,232 the company challenged
the class suit of customers on the basis that it violated the arbitration clauses in
the customers’ respective contracts.233 Justice Scalia expressed his sympathy
for corporate defendants when he wrote:
[C]lass arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants. . . . [W]hen
damages allegedly owed to tens of thousands of potential claimants are
aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an error will often become
unacceptable. Faced with even a small chance of a devastating loss,
defendants will be pressured into settling questionable claims.234
Vulnerable corporations were also pitied in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,235
which involved an attempted class action alleging an antitrust conspiracy

every dollar earned by the average full-time working man.”).
230 See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, GLASS CEILINGS: THE STATUS OF
WOMEN AS OFFICIALS AND MANAGERS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, at i (2004) (“Women
represent 48 percent of all employment, but represent only 36.4 percent of officials and
managers. Women make up 80.3 percent of office and clerical workers.”); see also INST. OF
LEADERSHIP & MGMT., AMBITION AND GENDER AT WORK 2 (2011) (“Our research found that
three quarters (73%) of women believe there are barriers preventing them from progressing
to the top levels of management. . . . Alongside well known obstacles to advancement such
as maternity and childcare-related issues, the findings reveal a number of less conspicuous,
but nevertheless critical, factors. In summary, the research reveals that women managers are
impeded in their careers by lower ambitions and expectations.”).
231 Professor Miller expressed a similar lament about the move toward restrictiveness
more generally when he wrote, “[W]e are moving slowly toward a system in which an
increasing number of civil actions may be stillborn.” Miller, supra note 184, at 596.
232 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
233 Id. at 1744-45.
234 Id. at 1752.
235 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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against regional telephone companies.236 There, rather than put the defendants
through the trouble of filing an answer, the Court rejected the complaint for
factual insufficiency, noting that “proceeding to antitrust discovery can be
expensive” and that “the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious
defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.”237
Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist’s fine tuning of summary judgment was the
most solicitous of civil defendants when he wrote:
Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of
persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to
have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of
persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner
provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no
factual basis.238
In seeking to right the balance between claimants and defendants, these cases
in truth tilted the balance in favor of the latter; Dukes is but the latest
manifestation of this trend, placing a thumb on the scale in favor of Wal-Mart
– and a finger in the eye of the Dukes plaintiffs – via the Court’s heightening
of commonality.
* * *
Dukes is merely the latest in a series of cases moving civil procedure in a
restrictive direction.239 In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,240 the Court
used a heightened personal jurisdiction doctrine to protect a foreign corporate
defendant against a suit by an individual plaintiff who had been severely
injured by a product of the defendant shipped to the victim’s state.241 The
Court did so despite the fact that the defendant intentionally shipped its

236

Id. at 550.
Id. at 558-59.
238 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); see also Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176, 178 (1974) (“Additionally, we might note that a preliminary
determination of the merits may result in substantial prejudice to a defendant, since of
necessity it is not accompanied by the traditional rules and procedures applicable to civil
trials. The court’s tentative findings, made in the absence of established safeguards, may
color the subsequent proceedings and place an unfair burden on the defendant.”).
239 Professor Miller critiques this trend as well: “The Court has given primacy to gate
keeping. It has accorded efficiency and cost reduction the status of primary systemic
objectives.” Miller, supra note 184, at 597; see also Malveaux, supra note 209, at 621 (“Is
there a crisis in the legal profession for civil litigants challenging systemic discrimination
and other corporate misconduct? While it may not have reached epidemic proportions,
plaintiffs are facing greater challenges bringing civil rights and consumer cases because of
procedural hurdles in the civil litigation system.”).
240 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
241 Id. at 2785.
237
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product – a shearing machine for the production of scrap metal – to its
distributor in Ohio for sale across the entire United States, including New
Jersey, the largest market for scrap metal.242 Iqbal’s and Twombly’s respective
heightenings of the general pleading standard under Rule 8 has already been
mentioned and is treated more extensively elsewhere,243 as are other recent
moves toward restrictive procedure.244 Only time will tell whether these cases
portend a permanent shift away from access to justice.245 In any event,
heightened commonality nicks away at access in ways that serve to provide
some confirmation of the restrictive ethos thesis and move us further in the
anti-access direction.246

242

Id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 103-27 (2010); Spencer, supra note 187,
at 460-89.
244 See generally Malveaux, supra note 209; Miller, supra note 184; Spencer, supra note
43.
245 It must be noted that this trend is not uniform or uninterrupted. One can find
procedural decisions by the Court that go the other way. See, e.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc.
v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185-86 (2011) (stating that plaintiffs in a private
securities fraud class action need not prove loss causation in order to obtain class
certification); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1438-39 (2010) (holding that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure trumps a
conflicting New York law prohibiting class actions under certain circumstances). Cases such
as these are arguably a challenge to the restrictiveness thesis, although I would argue that
the preponderance of the procedural cases incline in a restrictive direction.
246 This is not to say that the march toward restrictiveness is uniform in that direction.
For example, the Court ruled in favor of plaintiffs seeking the right to proceed under Rule
23 in a diversity case to enforce penalties that, under New York law, could not be litigated
via the class action device. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-37, 1448. However, Shady
Grove only goes so far; it was an endorsement for Rule 23 governing the question of
whether a class action may be entertained, not a decision that interpreted Rule 23 in a way
that improved the class certification prospects of litigants who invoke the rule. Compare this
“pro-plaintiff” decision with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119
Stat. 4, which “expanded” litigant access to federal court so that proposed classes could be
considered under the aegis of Rule 23, only to be held to higher certification standards on
arrival – standards Congress hoped would scuttle, not facilitate, putative class actions. See
S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14 (2005) (“[O]ne reason for the dramatic explosion of class actions
in state courts is that some state court judges are less careful than their federal court
counterparts about applying the procedural requirements that govern class actions. . . . In
contrast, federal courts generally scrutinize proposed settlements much more carefully and
pay closer attention to the procedural requirements for certifying a matter for class
treatment.”). Further, Justice Scalia’s endorsement of Rule 23 in Shady Grove is rooted in
his adherence to the terms of the Rules Enabling Act and the belief that rules promulgated
under that statute control the questions they embrace so long as they are procedural in
nature. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“What matters is what
the rule itself regulates: If it governs only ‘the manner and the means’ by which the
243
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CONCLUSION
In truth, the meaning of the common question requirement of Rule 23(a) is
self-evident as a matter of plain English. The history of the common question
phrasing and of Rule 23 itself, as well as the practice under rules containing
such language here and in England, however, make it clear that determining
commonality is a simple matter of seeing what questions, if any, would be
duplicated were each class claimant to proceed individually. For each claim
asserted by the Dukes plaintiffs, a common legal question was whether WalMart’s policy of excessive subjectivity in pay and promotion decisions by local
supervisors violates Title VII.247 Although that common question or others
may not have been good enough for the Dukes majority, they are good enough
for the rule: “The text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed.”248
One might retort that had the Dukes plaintiffs been permitted to seek
certification as a (b)(3) class, eventual application of its predominance
requirement would likely yield the same result reached in Dukes,
decertification of the class. That does not mean, however, that concern over
heightened commonality is much ado about nothing. First, by conducting an
implicit predominance analysis under the guise of commonality, parties get
none of the benefit of the jurisprudence surrounding predominance that might
otherwise be useful in litigating that question; rather, a new jurisprudence of
centrality will emerge. Second, predominance is only a concern of (b)(3) class
actions; smuggling such an inquiry into commonality makes predominance
pertinent now to all types of class actions, a constraint unsupported by the text
of Rule 23.249 Third, it matters that classes are decertified properly and not at
the hands of judicially contrived restrictions. Policy considerations may
certainly warrant a tightening of the standards for class certification, but that is
a result that “must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules,
and not by judicial interpretation.”250 Finally, tightening up the meaning of

litigants’ rights are ‘enforced,’ it is valid; if it alters ‘the rules of decision by which [the]
court will adjudicate [those] rights,’ it is not.” (alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Publ’g
Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946))).
247 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2567 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A system of delegated discretion . . . is a practice
actionable under Title VII when it produces discriminatory outcomes. A finding that WalMart’s pay and promotions practices in fact violate the law would be the first step in the
usual order of proof for plaintiffs seeking individual remedies for company-wide
discrimination.”).
248 Scalia, supra note 1, at 22.
249 Dean Klonoff makes this point as well. See Klonoff, supra note 22 (manuscript at 53)
(“This new interpretation of commonality should not significantly impact (b)(3) classes,
which require both commonality and predominance. The decision, however, could have a
significant impact on (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, effectively imposing a predominance
requirement where the drafters of Rule 23 chose not to include one.”).
250 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
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commonality will inevitably impact how the common question requirement is
treated in other contexts, namely Rule 20 (permissive joinder), Rule 24
(intervention), Rule 42 (consolidation), and the multidistrict litigation
statute.251 Such an eventuality would be unfortunate, as it would broaden the
move toward restrictiveness beyond the class action context and run counter to
the liberal joinder policy of the Federal Rules.252
What the Court has done in Dukes is quite dismaying. The members of the
Dukes majority – a collection of jurists who typically extoll the virtues of
judicial restraint,253 the supremacy of codified texts,254 and the detached
neutrality with which they exercise their craft255 – are either insincere or
simply oblivious to their own hypocrisy. To take a requirement that there be
“questions of law or fact common to the class” and declare that “the raising of
common ‘questions’ – even in droves” is not what matters to class certification
is a textbook illustration of judicial activism that departs from the plain
meaning of the text. How can the raising of common questions “in droves” not
matter to the issue of whether “there are questions of law or fact common to
the class”? Instead, the Dukes majority decided that commonality “requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same
injury’” and that the common questions be “central to the validity of each one
of the claims.”256 Where does it say that in the rule? As the sometimestextualist Justice Scalia would retort: it doesn’t.
Although it is in vogue for the Justices to declare the irrelevance of law
review articles,257 it is hoped that this writing will lead the Court to reconsider
163, 168 (1993).
251 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006).
252 See Charles E. Clark & James W. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE
L.J. 387, 1291 (1935).
253 Chief Justice Roberts, prior to joining the Supreme Court, drafted an article that
extolled the virtues of judicial restraint. John Roberts, Jr., Draft Article on Judicial Restraint
1 (undated) (on file with the National Archives), available at http://www.archives.gov/news
/john-roberts/accession-60-89-0372/doc006.pdf.
254 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 22.
255 See John Roberts, Jr., Opening Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee
(Sept. 12, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-09
-12-roberts-fulltext_x.htm) (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules; they
apply them.”); id. (“I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch
or bat.”).
256 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co.
of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-58 (1982) (speaking of “the existence of a class of
persons who have suffered the same injury as that individual, such that the individual’s
claim and the class claims will share common questions of law or fact and that the
individual’s claim will be typical of the class claims”)).
257 Chief Justice Roberts was recently dismissive of law review articles when he said:
Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the first article is likely to be, you
know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th Century
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the error of its approach to commonality. Doing so would be a simple matter of
applying the plain language of the rule. The Court should save its judgments
regarding the weight and import of the common questions for the
predominance assessment of Rule 23(b)(3). It is in that context, not
commonality, that courts are free to discount “droves” of common questions if
the conclusion that distinct questions are more significant is compelling. If
confining the predominance inquiry to Rule 23(b)(3) is not satisfying from a
policy perspective, however, then supporters of that view should propose that
Rule 23(a)(2) be amended to reflect that position. But, as Justice Scalia would
typically agree, the rule should not be “interpreted” to mean something that it
does not say.258 We have already been down that road with Rule 8(a) and the
newfound “plausibility” requirement.259 Otherwise, in addition to the Advisory
Committee Notes that follow the rule, publishers will need to insert the real
version of the rules as imagined by the Court so that judges and practitioners
will have clearer notice of the actual standards with which they will be
expected to comply.260
Friends of the rule of law and access to justice should be alarmed by what
the Court has done here. As Chief Justice John Roberts once rightly stated:
The greatest threat to judicial independence occurs when the courts
flout the basis for their independence by exceeding their constitutionally
limited role and the bounds of their expertise by engaging in
policymaking committed to the elected branches or the states. When
courts fail to exercise self-restraint and instead enter the political realms
reserved to the elected branches, they subject themselves to the political
pressure endemic to that arena and invite popular attack.261
Along the same lines, then-Justice Stone once said of the Court, “the only
check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint.”262
When that sole check erodes, popular faith in the Court risks being

Bulgaria, or something, which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote
it, but isn’t of much help to the bar.
John Roberts, Jr., Remarks at the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial Conference (June
25, 2011) (video recording available at http://www.c-span.org/Events/Annual-Fourth-Circui
t-Court-of-Appeals-Conference/10737422476-1/).
258 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2655 (2012) (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]o say that the Individual Mandate merely
imposes a tax is not to interpret the statute but to rewrite it.”).
259 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-87 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); note 172 and accompanying text.
260 See generally Effron, supra note 127 (discussing the “shadow rules” of joinder);
Walker, supra note 185 (discussing the background, common law doctrines that give us the
“other” Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
261 Roberts, supra note 253, at 3.
262 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
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diminished.263 Although we deal here not with a statute produced by the
political branches but rather codified rules largely superintended by the Court
itself through the rulemaking process, Chief Justice Roberts and then-Justice
Stone’s admonitions for self-restraint remain apropos. For though the
rulemaking process is less democratic, it is statutorily prescribed and subject to
input and public debate, including the opportunity for a congressional veto.264
The Court has no right to flout this process, which is precisely what it has done
here. Hopefully, lower courts can attempt some circumspection in approaching
commonality after Dukes, hewing more closely to the text of Rule 23(a)(2)
than did Justice Scalia. Even better would be for the Court itself to reconsider
its decision and restore commonality to the meaning embodied in the language
and history behind Rule 23.

263

Although the reasons may not, with any precision, be ascertained, the Supreme
Court’s popularity has plummeted in recent years, which at a minimum reflects a lowering
of public confidence in the Court. See Linda Feldmann, Supreme Court Popularity Hits a
New Low. Will Obama Attack?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 1, 2012),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0501/Supreme-Court-popularity-hits-new-low.-WillObama-attack (“Only 52 percent of the American public has a favorable opinion of the
court, down from 64 percent three years ago and a high of 80 percent favorability in 1994,
Pew [Research Center] reported on Tuesday.”).
264 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (2006).

